

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON WORLDWIDE THREATS

Thursday, April 29, 2021

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U.S. Senate

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Committee on Armed Services

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Washington, D.C.

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The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in

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Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jack Reed,

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chairman of the committee, presiding.

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Committee Members Present: Senators Reed [presiding],

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Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, King, Manchin,

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Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst,

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Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 RHODE ISLAND

3 Chairman Reed: Good morning. Before I turn to our
4 witnesses today, I would like to give my colleagues a
5 preview of what is ahead for the committee when we return
6 from the recess. Because of the uncertainty of the timing
7 of the President's budget submission, the committee has made
8 the difficult decision to delay the markup of the NDAA until
9 July, in consultation with Senator Inhofe, the ranking
10 member.

11 The Secretary of Defense, Chairman Millie, and the
12 military services will testify in June. That leaves May to
13 focus on hearings for nominations. We now have 23
14 nominations or intent to nominate, including three military
15 combatant commanders and two nominees of the National
16 Nuclear Security Administration. Getting these nominees
17 confirmed as quickly as possible will require many hearings,
18 including possible full committee hearings on Wednesday, so
19 I ask everyone to be as patient and as cooperative as
20 possible while we perform this very necessary oversight
21 duty.

22 Now, one other note. I am breaking a bit from, at
23 least, the tradition of the last several months, I would
24 like to take a moment to thank Leah Brewer, the committee's
25 nomination and hearing clerk, who has been the main force

1 behind ensuring this committee has kept operating through
2 COVID. She has mastered the technology of the hybrid
3 hearing, indeed, she is the only one who has.

4 And she has patiently rounded us up off the floor
5 countless times to vote civilian and military nominations
6 out of committee. She is an unsung heroine and I just
7 wanted to publicly acknowledge her and say how grateful we
8 are. Thank you.

9 [Applause.]

10 Chairman Reed: Now, turning to the hearing.

11 The committee will receive testimony from Director of
12 National Intelligence Avril Haines and Director of the
13 Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Scott Berrier
14 on the worldwide threats facing the United States and our
15 international partners.

16 It is important for the Congress and the American
17 people to hear from the leaders of our intelligence
18 community and I want to thank you both for being here. I
19 would also like to thank the opportunity to thank the men
20 and women under your leadership for their dedication and
21 service to the country.

22 This year's annual threat assessment of the Director of
23 National Intelligence highlights the complexity of the
24 current threat environment. The report finds that the
25 United States and its partners face, quote, a diverse array

1 of threats that are playing out amidst the global disruption
2 resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, and against the
3 backdrop of great power competition, the disruptive effects
4 of ecological degradation, and a changing climate, an
5 increasing number of empowered non-state actors, and rapidly
6 evolving technology.

7 The intricate and urgent nature of these threats will
8 drive how we resource and transform our tools and national
9 power, not only military, but also diplomatic, economic, and
10 informational. To respond to these complex security
11 challenges, we need to do all of these things.

12 The United States and its Democratic allies and
13 partners are increasingly challenged by states and non-state
14 actors that do not accept the international norms that have
15 underpinned our security and helped keep the peace for
16 decades. A recent report published by the Director of
17 National Intelligence, sought to project global trends over
18 the next 20 years and found that accelerating shifts in
19 military power, demographics, economic growth, environmental
20 conditions and technology, as well as hardening divisions
21 over governance models are likely to further ratchet up
22 competition between China and a western coalition lead by
23 the United States.

24 It is against this backdrop that the Department of
25 Defense has appropriately identified China as the pacing

1 threat for the United States military. At the same time, we
2 must avoid contributing to a perception that China is 10
3 feet tall. I hope our witnesses today will also describe
4 the challenges facing China, including demographic,
5 economic, and governmental, and how the United States and
6 our extensive network of allies and partners can best take
7 advantage of them in the coming years.

8 Russia is using a Whole-of-Government Approach to
9 accelerate competition and advance its interests, notably,
10 via disinformation campaigns, assassination attempts, cyber
11 espionage, and the use of mercenary groups in numerous
12 countries around the world. I hope our witnesses will help
13 us more fully understand the extent of Russia's malign
14 actions, as well as areas where our partners and allies
15 would benefit from greater U.S. support as they work to
16 bolster their capacity to resist such hybrid threats.

17 The rogue regimes in Iran and North Korea will continue
18 to demand attention and resources from the intelligence
19 community and Department of Defense and I am interested in
20 understanding how the intelligence community views the
21 threat posed by Iran, including their nuclear program and
22 destabilizing activities in the region, and how those
23 actions may constrain the Biden administration's diplomatic
24 efforts.

25 With respect to North Korea, I hope our witnesses will

1 help frame the challenges we are facing from Kim Jong-un,
2 what we may expect in the way of provocative actions, and
3 what leverage we may have to effect a change in the behavior
4 of that regime.

5 As we have heard from the commanders of U.S. Central
6 and Africa commands last week, the threat posed by violent
7 extremist groups persist. While President Biden has
8 announced a transition of forces out of Afghanistan by
9 September 11th, 2021, we must maintain the capability to
10 continual to degrade Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist
11 groups, and prevent attacks on the homeland. I am
12 interesting in hearing from the witnesses as to what
13 measures would be most effectively used to contain these
14 threats from these groups.

15 Now, turning briefly to the cyber threats we face,
16 hardly a week passes between revelations of serious breaches
17 by our principal adversaries and criminals against federal,
18 state, and local government institutions and private sector
19 enterprises. While most nations think cyber intrusions
20 against the United States involve theft of information, they
21 also demonstrate the potential for destructive attacks by
22 our adversaries on a larger scale, and I hope our witnesses
23 will share their candid concerns about these threats and
24 help us think through the best ways to confront them.

25 Once again, let me thank you for being here this

1 morning. I look forward to your testimony.

2 And before I turn it over to Ranking Member Inhofe, I
3 will remind my colleagues that there will be an informal,
4 classified briefing immediately following this session in
5 the Office of Senate Security, SV-217.

6 Ranking Member Inhofe?

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 OKLAHOMA

3 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Since its release in 2018, the committee's top priority
5 has been ensuring that we implement the National Defense
6 Strategy and if we are serious about the security of the
7 United States, we need the resources to make this NDS
8 happen. The President's budget request does not meet this
9 standard. It doesn't even keep up with inflation.

10 Our top military commanders have abundantly told us in
11 recent weeks that the threats to the United States are
12 growing at an alarming rate. To cut the defense budget in
13 the midst of these challenges is not just misguided, it is
14 dangerous.

15 Over the past several years, this committee has been
16 repeatedly warned of the pace and the scope of Russia and
17 China and their nuclear modernization. Just last week, the
18 commander of the U.S. Strike Command told this committee
19 that Russia has completed over 80 percent of its nuclear
20 force modernization; they have been busy. They also stated
21 that China has reached, and he used the word, he said
22 inflection point, where it is accelerating its nuclear and
23 modernization efforts and will reach operational parity with
24 the United States in the 2030s.

25 At the same time, China's modernization of its

1 conventional forces is accelerating at a startling pace.
2 They are outpacing us in developing critical technologies
3 like hypersonics, artificial intelligence, and quantum
4 computing. For a long time, most Americans believed that we
5 had the best of everything and that was something that was
6 kind of difficult after the Second World War and that was
7 pretty true, but it is not true now. For a long time, that
8 was the case, but now it is not.

9 At the same time, China's military ambitions are now
10 global. They are building bases and deploying advanced
11 capabilities in places like Africa and what the AFRICOM, the
12 commander called, quote, the number one global power
13 competition.

14 So, as China accelerates military capability, Putin has
15 not been dormant as we have seen in the buildup of Russian
16 forces around Ukraine and all of his activities there. We
17 need to understand that the globalization of China, this
18 Chinese aggression, Russian intimidation, as well as the
19 seriousness of our other threats we face around the world.

20 So, I look forward to the testimony and I have two
21 really critical questions I will be asking our witnesses,
22 Mr. Chairman.

23 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

24 And before I recognize the witnesses, let me, again,
25 remind my colleagues this is a hybrid hearing. We will not

1 follow the early Byrd rule. We will a seniority in terms of
2 recognition. A standard 5-minute questioning round is in
3 effect and would ask people to keep their eyes on the clock.

4 Finally, to allow everyone to participate fully, I
5 would ask all colleagues to please mute your microphone if
6 you are not speaking.

7 Let me begin with Director Haines.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. AVRIL HAINES, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
2 INTELLIGENCE

3 Mr. Haines: Thank you very much.

4 Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, members of the
5 committee, thank you for the opportunity to offer the
6 intelligence community's 2021 assessment of worldwide
7 threats to U.S. national security.

8 On behalf of the entire intelligence community, but
9 particularly those elements that sit within the Department
10 of Defense, I want to express to you how much we appreciate
11 your support and your partnership. I would also like to
12 take advantage of this moment to thank the men and women of
13 the intelligence community. Their efforts rarely receive
14 public accolades because of the nature of their work, but
15 they do help to keep us safe, often at great personal
16 sacrifice, and we remain committed to providing them with
17 the resources our mission requires and the support we owe
18 them. It is my honor to serve alongside these dedicated
19 officers and leaders, including General Berrier, and to
20 represent their work to you.

21 Our goal today is to convey to you and the public we
22 serve and protect, the threat environment as we perceive it
23 and to do our best to answer the questions about the
24 challenges we face. I will only highlight a few points and
25 provide some context in my opening statement. For a more

1 detailed threat picture, I refer you to the annual threat
2 assessment we issued earlier this month, which is a
3 reflection of the collective insights of the intelligence
4 community.

5 Broadly speaking, the intelligence community is focused
6 on traditional categories of issues that we have been
7 discussing for years: adversaries and competitors, critical
8 transnational threats, and conflicts and instability. And I
9 will summarize our views on these, but first, I want to take
10 note of the shifting landscape we see today and the
11 implications that has for our work.

12 The trends underlying and intersecting these issues are
13 increasing the pace, the complexity, and the impact of these
14 threats in ways that require us to evolve. During the past
15 year, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the inherent risks
16 of high levels of interdependence and in coming years, as
17 reflected in our recently issued global trends report that
18 was just discussed, we assess that the world will face under
19 intense and cascading global challenges ranging from disease
20 to climate change to disruptions from new technological and
21 financial crises.

22 And as we note in that report, these challenges will
23 repeatedly test the resilience and adaptability of
24 communities, states, and the international system, often
25 exceeding the capacity of existing systems and models. This

1 looming disequilibrium between existing and future
2 challenges, and the ability of institutions and systems to
3 respond is likely to grow and produce greater contestation
4 at every level.

5 And for the intelligence community, this insight
6 compels us to broaden our definition of national security,
7 to develop and integrate new and emerging expertise into our
8 work, deepen and strengthen our partnerships, and learn to
9 focus on the long-term, strategic threats, while
10 simultaneously addressing the urgent crises; in short, at no
11 point has it been more important to invest in our norms, our
12 institutions, our workforce, and the integration of our
13 work.

14 And doing so provides us with the opportunity to meet
15 the challenges we face, to pull together as a society, and
16 to promote resilience and innovation. And as we evolve, you
17 will see our efforts to more effectively integrate longer-
18 term, destabilizing trends into our daily work, thereby,
19 promoting strategic foresight and a deeper understanding of
20 the threats we face, which we hope will help the policy
21 community effectively prioritize their work to address the
22 issues that we seek to present.

23 Against this backdrop, the annual threat assessment
24 describes an array of threats that we are facing in the
25 coming year, beginning with those emanating from key state

1 actors. I will begin with China, which is on parallel
2 priority for the intelligence community, and then move to
3 Russia, Iran, and North Korea. And China, increasingly, is
4 a near peer competitor challenging the United States in
5 multiple arenas, while pushing to revise global norms in
6 ways that favor the authoritarian Chinese system.

7 China is employing a comprehensive approach to
8 demonstrate its growing strength and compel regional
9 neighbors to acquiesce in Beijing's preferences, including
10 its claims over disputed territory and assertions over the
11 sovereignty over Taiwan.

12 It also has substantial cyber capabilities that, if
13 deployed, at a minimum, can cause localized temporary
14 disruptions to critical infrastructure inside the United
15 States. And while China poses an increasingly formidable
16 challenge to the U.S. role in global affairs, it is worth
17 noting, as the chairman did, that its economic,
18 environmental, and demographic vulnerabilities all threaten
19 to complicate its ability to manage the transition to the
20 dominate role it appears it aspires to in the decades ahead.

21 And next, with respect to Russia, we assess Moscow will
22 continue to employ a variety of tactics to undermine U.S.
23 influence and erode western alliances. While Russia does
24 not want a conflict with the United States, Russian
25 officials have long believed that Washington is seeking to

1 weaken Russia and Moscow will use a range of tools to pursue
2 its objectives, including mercenary operations,
3 assassinations, and arms sales.

4 It will also employ, as we've reported, new weapons and
5 cyber capabilities to threaten the United States and its
6 allies, and seeks to use malign influence campaigns,
7 including in the context of U.S. elections to undermine our
8 global standing, sow discord, and influence U.S. decision-
9 making.

10 Russia is becoming increasingly adept at leveraging its
11 technological prowess to develop asymmetric options in both,
12 the military and cyber spheres in order to give itself the
13 ability to push back and force the United States to
14 accommodate to its interests.

15 And turning to Iran, Tehran is seeking to project power
16 in neighboring states, deflect international pressure, and
17 minimize threats to regime stability. Iraq will be a key
18 battleground for Iranian influence in the coming year, but
19 Tehran will also continue to pursue a permanent military
20 presence in Syria, destabilize Yemen, and threaten Israel.

21 And for its part, North Korea may take aggressive and
22 potentially destabilizing actions to reshape its security
23 environment and will seek to drive wedges between the United
24 States and its allies. These efforts could include the
25 resumption of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic

1 missile testing in the future.

2 When it comes to transnational threats, the assessment
3 focuses on key issues that intersect with the state actor
4 threats that I just outlined, starting with COVID-19. The
5 effects of the current pandemic will obviously continue to
6 strain governments and societies over the coming year,
7 fueling humanitarian and economic crises, political unrest,
8 and geopolitical competition, as countries, such as Russia
9 and China, seek advantage through vaccine diplomacy, to
10 build influence, and in some cases, demand exceptions from
11 other governments.

12 Countries with high debts or they depend on oil
13 exports, tourism, or remittances face particularly
14 challenging recoveries, while others will turn inward and be
15 distracted by other challenges. And the critical impact of
16 the pandemic has also served to highlight the importance of
17 public health to national security. Ecological degradation
18 and a changing climate will continue to fuel disease
19 outbreaks, threaten food and water security, exacerbate
20 political instability, and humanitarian crises.

21 And although much of the effect of a changing climate
22 on U.S. security will play out indirectly in a broader
23 political and economic context, warmer weather can generate
24 direct and immediate impacts, for example, through more
25 intense, frequent, and variable weather events, in addition

1 to driving conflicts over scarce natural resources.

2 And the changing climate conflict and economic
3 deprivation will drive vulnerable populations from their
4 homes, heightening humanitarian needs and increasing the
5 risks of political upheaval.

6 The scourge of illicit dangerous drugs and
7 transnational organized crime will continue to take its toll
8 on American lives, prosperity, and safety. Major narcotics-
9 trafficking groups and other transnational organized
10 criminal organizations will continue to drive threat streams
11 while also being used by adversaries employing cyber tools
12 to steal from U.S. and foreign businesses and use complex
13 financial schemes to launder illicit proceeds undermining
14 confidence in financial institutions.

15 Emerging and disruptive technologies, as well as the
16 proliferation and permeation of technology in all aspects of
17 our lives pose unique challenges. And cyber capabilities,
18 to illustrate, are demonstrably intertwined with threats
19 from our infrastructure to foreign malign influence threats
20 against our democracy.

21 And we need, as many of you have stressed to us, to
22 focus on the competition in critical technical areas, such
23 as high-performance computing, microelectronics,
24 biotechnology, artificial intelligence, quantum computing,
25 fiberoptics, and metamaterials.

1 And with regard to global terrorism, ISIS and Al Qaeda
2 remain the most pressing threats to U.S. interests overseas.
3 These groups seek to conduct attacks inside the United
4 States, but sustained counterterrorism pressure has broadly
5 degraded their capabilities.

6 Domestically, lone actors and small cells with a broad
7 range of ideological motivations pose a greater immediate
8 threat. We see this threat manifest itself in individuals
9 who are inspired by Al Qaeda and ISIS, often could homegrown
10 violent extremists, and those who commit terrorist acts for
11 ideological goals, stemming from other influences, such as
12 racial bias and anti-governmental sentiment, which we refer
13 to as domestic violent extremism, or DVE.

14 And DVE, an increasingly complex threat that is growing
15 in the United States, these extremists often see themselves
16 as part of a broader global movement and, in fact, a number
17 of other countries are experience a rise in DVE, for
18 example, Australia, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom,
19 consider white racially or ethnically motivated violent
20 extremists, including neo-Nazi groups, to be the fastest
21 growing terrorist threat that they face.

22 And, of course, regional conflicts continue to fuel
23 humanitarian crises, undermine stability, and threaten U.S.
24 persons in interest. The fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
25 Syria has a direct implication for U.S. forces, while

1 tensions between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan remain a
2 concern for the world. The iterative violence between
3 Israel and Iran, the activity of foreign powers in Libya and
4 the conflicts in other areas, including Africa and the
5 Middle East, have the potential to escalate or spread.

6 And Asia has periodic upheavals as the Burmese
7 military's seizure of power in February, Latin America has
8 contested elections, and violent popular protests are likely
9 to continue to produce volatility while Africa will continue
10 to see ongoing marginalization of some communities, ethnic
11 conflict, and contentious elections.

12 In closing, we face a broad array of longstanding and
13 emerging threats whose intersection is raising the potential
14 to cascading crises. Our increasingly interconnected and
15 mobile world offers enormous opportunities, but at the same
16 time, it multiplies our challenges, calling us to even
17 greater vigilance as we seek to protect our vital national
18 interests, promote resilience, and invest in our
19 institutions and our people, who will be the only and best
20 answer to addressing these challenges.

21 And investing in our workforce means taking care of our
22 people and we are committed to doing so. The intelligence
23 community is currently focused on supporting the retrograde
24 that will occur as we withdraw from Afghanistan by ensuring
25 that we provide the best intelligence to support the

1 Secretary of Defense and the chairman's work as they bring
2 our forces home in a safe, orderly, and deliberate way.

3 And taking care of our people also means investigating
4 the source of anomalous health incidents that have affected
5 our personnel and caring for those affected. We appreciate
6 the support that many of you have shown for our personnel,
7 as with everything else we work on around the globe and we
8 look forward to answering your questions about these and
9 other worldwide threats. Thank you.

10 [The prepared statement of Mr. Haines follows:]

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1 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Director.

2 General Berrier, please?

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1 STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SCOTT BERRIER,
2 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3 General Berrier: Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking
4 Member Inhofe, and committee members. Thank you for the
5 opportunity to discuss the threats facing this nation and
6 DIA's support to the National Defense Strategy.

7 The nature and scope of the national security
8 environment in which we operate is largely shaped by
9 strategic competition; the continuous push and pull among
10 the United States, China and Russia for global strength and
11 influence. DIA's cadre of remarkable personnel works
12 diligently to provide the integrated defense intelligence
13 picture providing the U.S., along with our allies, a
14 decision advantage across all warfighting domains and
15 geographic boundaries, with competitors who intend to
16 challenge, limit, or exceed our military lead.

17 Their capabilities include more lethal ballistic and
18 cruise missiles, growing nuclear stockpiles, and gray zone
19 measures such as ambiguous unconventional forces, foreign
20 proxies, information manipulation, cyberattacks, and
21 economic coercion. Advances in materials, high-performance
22 computing, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology will
23 augment potential adversaries' military and technological
24 capabilities.

25 The evolving threat from the COVID-19 pandemic also has

1 major implications for our national security. China and
2 Russia are using COVID-19 circumstances to conduct
3 information warfare aimed at undermining Western
4 governments, attacking coalitions, and compelling economic
5 and political outcomes in their favor.

6 China remains a long-term strategic competitor to the
7 United States. As a pacing threat, it poses a major
8 security challenge. Beijing views the international
9 environment and its ties to Washington as increasingly
10 adversarial. It uses multiple approaches, including
11 diplomatic, economic, espionage, and military to achieve its
12 strategic aims.

13 China continues its decades-long military,
14 modernization to build an increasingly lethal force that
15 will almost certainly be able to hold U.S. and allied forces
16 at risk at greater distances from the Chinese mainland.

17 The Russian military is an existential threat to the
18 United States. Russia has a growing ability to project
19 power with long-range precision cruise missiles, and its
20 military leaders are incorporating lessons from Russia's
21 involvement in Syria into training and exercises as they
22 seek to improve their joint forces.

23 Moscow investment in conventional forces, strategic
24 nuclear forces, and in enhancement of its strategic
25 deterrent place the U.S. homeland at risk. Russia seeks to

1 dominate its periphery through whole-of-state efforts.

2 Both China and Russia consider space integral to
3 winning wars and have reorganized their militaries to
4 integrate space operations and counterspace capabilities.

5 In addition to these two state actors, North Korea also
6 poses a serious challenge to the United States and our
7 allies. Pyongyang did not abandon its nuclear or long-range
8 missile test programs as it pursued diplomatic engagement to
9 soften international support for sanctions. Since mid-2019,
10 it has tested dozens of missiles, including three types of
11 new short-range ballistic missiles and a new sea-launched
12 ballistic missile.

13 In the Middle East, Iran is the primary state
14 challenger to U.S. interests because of its sophisticated
15 military capabilities, broad proxy and partner networks, and
16 periodic willingness to use force against U.S. and partner
17 forces. Iran's security strategy aims to ensure continuity
18 of clerical rule, maintain internal stability, secure
19 dominant regional power status, and achieve economic
20 prosperity.

21 In South Asia, violence in Afghanistan remains elevated
22 as peace negotiations have slowed since initiation in late
23 2020. Talks are highly unlikely to result in extended
24 ceasefires or violence reduction while the Taliban continues
25 to apply military pressure on the Afghan government.

1 At the same time, the threat from terrorist
2 organizations will persist. ISIS remains the preeminent
3 Salafi jihadist group, sustaining more than a dozen
4 insurgencies globally. It is expanding its African presence
5 and probably rebuilding its ability to direct attacks in the
6 West. Al Qaeda's appeal to Salafist jihadists has waned
7 since ISIS' emergence and counterterrorism pressure has
8 eliminated many of Al Qaeda's senior leaders.

9 Transnational, racially, and ethnically motivated
10 violent extremists, or (RMVE) organizations, operate across
11 borders, and attract recruits and spread ideology online.
12 The United States will increasingly face advanced,
13 persistent, and sophisticated cyberattacks from an array of
14 state and non-state actors. Adversarial probing and
15 exploitation of military and intelligence networks, efforts
16 to coerce our personnel and monitor U.S. force movement and
17 attempts to steal weapons systems technology are all
18 threats.

19 Today's threat environment reflects rapid, significant,
20 technological change and adversarial challenges in every
21 operating domain. I am committed to ensuring DIA is
22 positioned to meet these challenges through the efforts in
23 such areas as modernization of the top-secret IT network DIA
24 manages for DOD and the intelligence community, building
25 advanced modeling and simulation capabilities, and creating

1 a data environment that will enhance and enrich how we
2 provide foundational military intelligence to warfighters
3 and decision makers.

4 Your support of the exceptional DIA enterprise enables
5 us to provide the integrated defense intelligence picture,
6 which gives the nation and our allies a decision advantage.
7 I am privileged and proud to lead DIA and its outstanding
8 workforce. Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I,
9 along with the Director, look forward to your questions.

10 [The prepared statement of General Berrier follows:]

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1 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, General.

2 Let me direct a question to both, the Director and to
3 General Berrier. There has been a public debate about our
4 commitment to Taiwan. Right now, we maintain the practice
5 of strategic ambiguity. There are others that urge us to
6 take explicit action in the case of any Chinese demands
7 against Taiwan.

8 Starting with Director Haines, how would you evaluate
9 China and Taiwan's reaction to a change in our policy by
10 adopting explicit commitments?

11 Mr. Haines: Thank you, Chairman.

12 From our perspective, if we were to see a U.S. shift
13 from strategic ambiguity, as you've identified it, to
14 clarity over a willingness to intervene in a Taiwan
15 contingency, the Chinese would find this deeply
16 destabilizing. I think it would solidify Chinese
17 perceptions that the U.S. is bent on constraining China's
18 rise, including for military force, and would probably cause
19 Beijing to aggressively undermine U.S. interests worldwide.
20 That would be our assessment.

21 Chairman Reed: And the reaction in Taiwan, would you
22 precipitate a surge towards further separation from China?

23 Mr. Haines: I think that is possible. I would say
24 that already Taiwan is hardening, to some extent, toward
25 independence as they are watching, essentially what happened

1 in Hong Kong, and I think that is an increasing challenge.

2 Chairman Reed: Thank you.

3 General, your comments, please?

4 General Berrier: Chairman, from a DI perspective, we
5 understand that is the goal for Xi to unify Taiwan with
6 China. We don't know that he has made a decision on how or
7 when to do that. We have seen an increase in PLA activity
8 on the sea and in the airspace around Taiwan over the last
9 year.

10 With everything going on in China right now, and I'm
11 thinking Hong Kong, Tibet, also the Uyghur issue, I think
12 these are one of the key core issues that we have to deal
13 with as we watch China.

14 Chairman Reed: Just a quick follow-up. Some have
15 suggested, I think Admiral Davidson, when he was here, said
16 there is a critical time frame between now and 2030 in terms
17 of Taiwan, 6 years, because his interpretation, as I recall,
18 was out to that demographic issues, economic issues start
19 playing a more prominent role in Chinese policy.

20 So, is there any sense, Director Haines, of a timing
21 issue here or a period of vulnerability?

22 Mr. Haines: I think maybe we can discuss this further
23 in closed session?

24 Chairman Reed: Yeah, I would be happy to. Thank you.

25 And Director Haines, again, in your testimony in your

1 confirmation hearing, you indicated the support for a firm
2 align influence response center, which would be a Whole-of-
3 Government effort. Where are we on that regard? What
4 status can you give us?

5 Mr. Haines: Thank you, Chairman.

6 So, we have begun to try to establish, essentially, an
7 outline of what this would look like. We've been working
8 with the intelligence community more broadly to make sure
9 that what we do at the Office of the Director of National
10 Intelligence isn't sort of a redundancy of what is already
11 being done in different components, but rather, is an
12 opportunity for us to coordinate this work across the
13 community, provide coordinated assessments to policymakers
14 and ultimately provide some expertise that might be
15 valuable, again, across the community where it may be
16 filling gaps that certain components don't have, things
17 along those lines.

18 But we are moving with alacrity towards that and if you
19 would like further information on this, we can give it to
20 you as we are sort of forming it effectively.

21 Chairman Reed: Thank you. Now, there has been some
22 discussion about a social media data threat analysis center,
23 since social media is playing a critical role in everything
24 we do, it seems.

25 Any thoughts on the possibility of standing something

1 like that up?

2 Mr. Haines: Thank you. I think I am not aware of a
3 plan to do that more generally. That may be the case in
4 other departments and agencies.

5 I would say we would expect that open-source
6 information will be a critical aspect of what we would
7 essentially analyze in the context of a foreign malign
8 influence center and we obviously have open-source centers
9 across the community that work on these issues.

10 Chairman Reed: Thank you.

11 My time has expired, General Berrier, but I want to
12 commend DIA for taking the lead in integrating artificial
13 intelligence and other techniques into our intelligence
14 gathering. And we will have an opportunity in the closed
15 session to discuss those issues. Thank you very much.

16 Senator Inhofe, please?

17 Senator Inhofe: Yeah, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 As I said in my opening statement, we have been
19 repeatedly warned in this committee about what Russia and
20 China are doing in terms of their nuclear modernization and,
21 frankly, what we haven't been doing over the last many
22 years. Last year, the strike commander talked about over 80
23 percent of the nuclear force that Russia has actually
24 excelled and China has reached what they call the inflection
25 point.

1 So, General Berrier, a recent report by the independent
2 Institute for Defense Analyses concluded that neither China,
3 Russia, nor North Korea, would view the United States'
4 adoption of a no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons as
5 credible. They just wouldn't believe us, and as a result,
6 the United States' adoption of a no-first-use nuclear policy
7 would likely have little or no impact on their nuclear
8 ambitions or policies.

9 But what it would do is significantly undermine the
10 confidence of our allies in the United States' security
11 guarantee. So, I would ask you, General Berrier, first of
12 all, do you agree with this assessment and then, do you know
13 of any organization, any intelligent assessment that you are
14 aware of that would contradict these conclusions?

15 General Berrier: Senator Inhofe, I am not aware of any
16 current intelligence that has been produced lately that
17 discusses that topic. I believe that the Russians and
18 Chinese evaluate their own deterrent capabilities and they
19 look at threats broadly across the globe and make decisions
20 about their nuclear force, just the same way we do.

21 Senator Inhofe: In your personal opinion?

22 General Berrier: My opinion is that any statement we
23 make probably would not have a significant impact on how
24 they view their nuclear force.

25 Senator Inhofe: Thank you very much.

1 Now, the committee heard last week from AFRICOM,
2 General Townsend, that China views Africa as a key power
3 projection platform for its military, and I believe that is
4 true. China has built for the first, up until just about 2
5 or 3 years ago, China didn't do anything outside of its own
6 limits, but now, of course, they got busy down in Djibouti.
7 I have been down there. I have flown over that area. I
8 know what they are doing down there. It is aggressively
9 pursuing a naval base on the West Coast of Africa that would
10 give China an enduring military presence in the Atlantic.
11 And General Townsend called this his number one global power
12 competition concern.

13 General Berrier, do you agree with General Townsend
14 that China views Africa as a key power projection platform
15 for its military?

16 General Berrier: Senator, I believe the Chinese, in
17 order for safeguard their Belt and Road Initiative, will
18 place military forces where they see they need that kind of
19 capability. Africa is certainly one of those places where
20 they have done that.

21 The interesting thing about the way they look at Africa
22 is sort of this long-term developmental approach, which will
23 allow them, over a long period, to put more forces there.
24 So, do I agree with General Townsend, but in the extent that
25 Africa is one area where strategic competition will play

1 out, it will also play out in Latin America and South
2 America, and wherever they extend their markets, you will
3 find that activity.

4 Senator Inhofe: That activity, but staying with
5 Africa, we are talking about East and West Africa, their
6 activities, this is something that is fairly new. And I
7 would agree with your comments on that, as well as General
8 Townsend.

9 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

11 Let me now recognize Senator Shaheen.

12 Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
13 you both for your testimony this morning and for your very
14 good work.

15 Director Haines, I would like to begin with you,
16 because I am sure you have seen the report on CNN today that
17 suggests that there were at least two possible incidents on
18 U.S. soil of the directed-energy attacks that have created
19 symptoms sometimes called Havana Syndrome in a number of our
20 personnel. One of the incidents described here was,
21 happened on the Ellipse in late 2020, and that is very close
22 to the White House.

23 So, I am not going to ask you if that report is correct
24 or not, because I recognize that there has been a real
25 effort to try to keep this information classified, but I do

1 want to ask you about the concern that I have, that that
2 kind of clamp-down on information that is available to
3 Congress, that is available to the public, has led to leaks
4 and it is not clear whether the information we are getting
5 is correct or incorrect.

6 And so, I wonder if you could speak to that and to what
7 more can be done to declassify some of that information,
8 share it with members of Congress in a way that allows us to
9 better respond; after all, we have to fund operations and
10 there are a lot of personnel, not a lot, there are personnel
11 who have been harmed who we need to make sure get the care
12 and benefits they need.

13 Mr. Haines: Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your
14 attention on this issue.

15 It is critically important and it is something that I,
16 I know General Berrier, I know across the intelligence
17 community, frankly, leaders are focused on this issue.

18 On your particular question with respect to
19 information, I would be happy to look at this with you, to
20 be honest. I think I completely understand getting the
21 information is critical for you to be able to respond to
22 these issues and ensure that you are able to make good
23 decisions. Maybe we can talk more about this also in closed
24 session, these questions.

25 And I think, you know, our concern, obviously with the

1 classification is because we believe that either it is
2 protecting sources or methods and it is critical to our
3 national security, and we will have to figure that out with
4 you, but you should certainly have access to the classified
5 information, and we should figure out if there is a way to
6 help you address these issues more readily.

7 Senator Shaheen: Well, again, I would argue that with
8 stories like this, with stories that have appeared over the
9 last 2 years, really, and those people who have been
10 affected who have gone public, that the horse is out of the
11 barn on this. The information is already out there, and I
12 think it behooves us all to try and make sure that the
13 information that gets out is accurate and that people
14 understand what is happening and that there is an effort to
15 respond to that. So, I would urge you to consider that.

16 And as we are talking about classification, I should
17 also thank your office for providing a declassified
18 assessment of the impact of our withdrawal in Afghanistan on
19 the Afghan women. It is something that I requested and I
20 appreciate that we got that yesterday or the day before, so
21 thank you for doing that. Unfortunately, it shows that, or
22 it suggests that there is a real threat that faces women and
23 girls in Afghanistan after we withdraw.

24 But in my limited time, I want to go to Syria, because
25 one of the real challenges that I believe we are still

1 facing there is the detainee camps that have tens of
2 thousands of people in some of them. In the al-Hol camp in
3 Northeast Syria, we know that there are ISIS leaders who are
4 still there, who are raising a whole other generation of
5 potential terrorists.

6 And I understand the Kurds just did an operation there
7 to try and root out some of those ring leaders. But we
8 also, 2 years ago, put into the NDAA, a position to create a
9 detainee coordinator to try and help get some of these
10 detainees repatriated to the countries that they came from.
11 No one has been appointed to that position yet and I believe
12 that continues to be a real threat.

13 And the more we can do in cooperation with our allies
14 and the international community to respond to that, the
15 better we are going to address that potential threat. So, I
16 would urge you to take a look at that, and if you could,
17 report are back to the committee about what the plan is for
18 that detainee coordinator.

19 Mr. Haines: Thank you, Senator.

20 I suspect that is a detainee coordinator at the
21 Department of Defense; is that right, ma'am?

22 Senator Shaheen: It is.

23 Mr. Haines: Okay. I will work, obviously, with the
24 Secretary of Defense and we will work through.

25 Senator Shaheen: Yeah. I am assuming you all talk to

1 each other, so uh --

2 Mr. Haines: We do. Thank you.

3 Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

4 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

6 Let me recognize via Webex, Senator Fischer.

7 Senator Fischer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 General Berrier, DIA's 2018 report on the global
9 nuclear landscape stated that Russia is, quote, updating its
10 warhead production complex and is producing what we assess
11 to be hundreds of nuclear warheads each year.

12 The following year, your predecessor, General Ashley,
13 stated that, quote, Russia claims to be developing new
14 warhead designs for strategic systems, such as a new, high-
15 yield, Earth-penetrating warhead to attack hardened military
16 targets like the U.S., allied, and Chinese command and
17 control facilities, end quote.

18 Do these assessments remain valid and has there been
19 any decrease or reduction in terms of warhead design or
20 production activities taking place?

21 General Berrier: Senator, those assessments remain
22 valid to date, and I would be happy to go into more detail
23 in a closed session.

24 Senator Fischer: Thank you. Also, General Ashley
25 stated, quote, the United States believes that Russia

1 probably is not adhering to the nuclear testing moratorium
2 in a manner consistent with the yield, or with the zero-
3 yield standard. The United States, by contrast, is
4 upholding a zero-yield standard, end quote.

5 He went on to indicate that China was also not adhering
6 to the same zero-yield approach to nuclear testing that the
7 United States observes.

8 Does that still remain the DIA's assessment?

9 General Berrier: It does, Senator.

10 Senator Fischer: Director Haines, is there anything
11 that you would like to add to this?

12 Mr. Haines: No, ma'am, thank you.

13 Senator Fischer: Thank you.

14 General Berrier, in your prepared testimony, you
15 describe chemical and biological threats from Russia and
16 North Korea, in particular, but also China. Can you broadly
17 characterize chemical and biological threats? Are they
18 significant? Are there trends that you can share? Is the
19 threat increasing or decreasing, for example?

20 General Berrier: Senator, what I can say is open
21 testimony is that those countries that were mentioned in the
22 assessment do have active programs. We monitor those very,
23 very carefully in a number of sensitive ways, and we have
24 actually seen the Russians use some of their latest weapons
25 on individuals recently. So, we can go into more detail in

1 a closed session.

2 Senator Fischer: Okay. It also notes that China's
3 chemical infrastructure and Russia's pharmaceutical-based
4 agents program can provide those nations with chemical and
5 biological capabilities, respectively.

6 Can you talk a bit more about the dual-use nature of an
7 industrial capability and how that can also support a
8 military capability?

9 General Berrier: Senator, the dual-use nature of some
10 of those technologies to produce pharmaceuticals and
11 chemical and biological weapons are intertwined very closely
12 and it is sometimes difficult to discern the real, true
13 intent behind some of those facilities. But beyond that, I
14 can go into more detail in a closed session.

15 Senator Fischer: Also, sir, in your prepared
16 testimony, you note that Russia has restarted production of
17 long-range missile delivery platforms. That they are
18 fielding ultra-quiet cruise-missile submarines and they are
19 investing heavily in hypersonic weapons.

20 What is your overall assessment of Russia's long-range
21 conventional strike capabilities and is this a reflection of
22 a desire or a strategy that involves holding the homeland at
23 risk, below the threshold of nuclear conflict?

24 General Berrier: Senator, the Russians can hold the
25 U.S. homeland at risk below that threshold. They have

1 invested heavily in modernizing a number of initial
2 capabilities and weapons that you mentioned, and they
3 continue to develop those weapons, even in a constrained
4 financial environment in the hydrocarbon market, at its
5 lower rate, continues to challenge their ability to fund
6 their programs.

7 Senator Fischer: Director Haines, do you have anything
8 to add on these points?

9 Mr. Haines: No, thank you.

10 Senator Fischer: Thank you.

11 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Fischer.

13 Now, I would like to recognize Senator King via Webex.

14 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 Director Haines, I would like to ask you a question I
16 ask pretty much every foreign policy leader that we have
17 before this committee. What is your analysis of what
18 China's goals are, what does China want?

19 Mr. Haines: Thank you, Senator.

20 Well, obviously, I'm not here as a foreign-policy
21 analyst, but, regardless, I am happy to give you a sense of
22 how the analysts perceive it. I think as a general matter,
23 China sees itself as rising and sees the United States as
24 declining and is not interested in going to war, but
25 perceives that as a concern, as these trajectories from

1 their perspective, pass each other in a sense.

2 And in that context, China believes that the United
3 States is trying to check China's rise and in that context,
4 is countering, from their perspective, again, what they
5 perceive to be our influence and our efforts in this area.
6 I think in their perception, they are increasingly
7 perceiving it as a zero-sum game and that promotes, in a
8 sense, their efforts to really push us out in a way and to
9 be a threat across a range of factors and see us as a threat
10 to them in that context.

11 Senator King: Let me change the subject.

12 To what extent, and you mentioned this in your opening
13 testimony and in your written statement, expand a bit on
14 climate change as a national security concern. The one I am
15 particularly concerned about is incipient migration from
16 areas of the world that become essentially uninhabitable
17 because of drought, famine, extreme heat.

18 Do you see this as a threat multiplier, as a serious
19 national security concern, as well, of course, as an
20 environmental concern?

21 Mr. Haines: I do, absolutely.

22 I mean, I think part of the challenge for us is
23 recognizing that climate change has just enormous impact in
24 every aspect of our lives and with respect to almost every
25 threat that we are facing, is figuring out how to actually

1 embed and integrate climate science and analysis,
2 essentially, across the board of our intelligence community
3 work so that we can ensure that we are actually lifting up
4 the places where it is, in fact, having that kind of impact.

5 So, to your point, without question, the impact to the
6 climate is having on migration is something that we have
7 written about within the intelligence community, the trend
8 lines that that produces, the concerns that that creates.

9 Another example is in the context of increased droughts
10 and sort of the shifting boundaries of dry areas. What you
11 see is that affects agriculture. That, in turn, creates
12 tension that can drive conflict, for example. That is
13 another aspect of it.

14 You see an increase in floods. That is obviously a
15 challenge for countries around the world, particularly ones
16 that don't have the resilience to react to them in a way
17 that allows them to continue, you know, and can actually
18 promote fractures of society as a consequence over time.
19 So, there are just so many different aspects and dimensions
20 to this challenge, and what we have been trying to do is
21 ensure that we can actually bring in that expertise and
22 integrate it effectively and make it available for us, the
23 community, so that we can integrate that work into our daily
24 work, in effect, while also looking at the long-term trends
25 that it produces.

1 Senator King: And, of course, historically, access to
2 arable land has been the cause of wars throughout our
3 history. We have pivoted, largely, from a focus on
4 terrorism to peer and near-peer state competition, and I
5 understand that and I think that is appropriate.

6 I am still concerned, however, about the terrorist
7 threat, and the particular one that keeps me up at night is
8 terrorist access to a nuclear device, either through
9 development or more likely through purchase. Deterrence has
10 protected us from a nuclear conflict for 70 years.
11 Deterrence wouldn't work with a terrorist organization.

12 Talk to me about the role of intelligence in protecting
13 us from the nightmare of a nuclear weapon in the hold of a
14 tramp steamer bound into the Port of New York or Miami.

15 Mr. Haines: Yeah, absolutely, Senator.

16 And I know you know a fair amount about how we work on
17 these issues, particularly given your role on the
18 Intelligence Committee. I would say that part of the effort
19 in, as you say, the rebalancing effect, recognizing the rise
20 of state-to-state competition is not taking your eye off the
21 ball of non-state actor and transnational threats, including
22 terrorism. And that is absolutely something that we are
23 committed to.

24 And in the context of particular terrorist groups, we
25 monitor and try to track them to the best degree we can. It

1 is a diffuse issue, as you know, spanning many regions of
2 the globe. We are, in particular, looking for the kinds of
3 weapons that they can use that give them, you know,
4 extraordinary capacity to have catastrophic effects and we
5 look to ensure that we understand those networks as best we
6 can and then provide whatever warning we are capable of
7 providing under the circumstances.

8 I think beyond that, we can, obviously, talk further in
9 closed session.

10 Senator King: Thank you. I think the attackers on
11 September 11th killed 3,000 people. They would have killed
12 3 million if they could have. Thank you very much.

13 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator King.

15 And now via Webex, Senator Cotton, please?

16 Senator Cotton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 General Berrier, you stated in your testimony submitted
18 ahead of this hearing that we previously expected China to
19 double their nuclear stockpile by the end of the decade, but
20 both you and Admiral Richard have now testified before the
21 committee that the PLA is going to exceed that estimate.
22 Why do you think the PLA is so rapidly building up its
23 nuclear arsenal, is it to defend its homeland? Deter
24 perceived regional threats? Or to project power globally?

25 General Berrier: Senator Cotton, thank you for the

1 question. Broadly speaking, China's rise has also included
2 in massive military modernization and in the span of
3 capabilities that they have, the nuclear piece has been one
4 component. It has been a priority for them and I think they
5 have racked and stacked that in the things that they think
6 they need to get done by 2030 or 2035, and so I think they
7 have accelerated this as a deterrent, quite honestly.

8 Senator Cotton: Why do you say that the Chinese
9 Government tends to keep its nuclear forces in a launch-
10 inuring posture, and how is that a change from previous
11 assessments of China's nuclear forces?

12 General Berrier: Senator Cotton, I think the Chinese
13 military, through their modernization and training efforts,
14 have undergone a lot of exercises where they try to
15 understand what gives them the most viable capability and
16 the quickest, and I think this is an evolution of their
17 training and doctrine.

18 Senator Cotton: Is China capable of arming its
19 hypersonic flight vehicles with nuclear warheads, and if so,
20 what kind of risk does that pose to the United States and
21 our interests?

22 General Berrier: The answer to that question is, yes,
23 and that poses a significant risk.

24 Senator Cotton: Can you explain why it poses that
25 significant risk.

1 General Berrier: The speed at which those weapons
2 travel makes it very, very difficult to track and their
3 entire trajectory. We can go into more are detail, Senator,
4 in a closed session.

5 Senator Cotton: As compared to a traditional ballistic
6 missile?

7 General Berrier: Correct.

8 Senator Cotton: Okay. Let's turn to Russia.

9 You testified in your written statement that Russia now
10 claims to have modernized over 80 percent of its own nuclear
11 Triad, including sonic submarines, knew strategic bombers,
12 and an upgraded ICBM force. How does the Russian ICBM force
13 now compare to that of the United States in terms of
14 modernization?

15 General Berrier: Senator, I would prefer to discuss
16 that in a closed session.

17 Senator Cotton: Okay. Have the Russians created or
18 fielded a hypersonic flight vehicle that is capable of
19 matching up to a nuclear warhead?

20 General Berrier: Senator, they are in the process of
21 doing that right now.

22 Senator Cotton: That proposes the same risks that
23 China's hypersonic flight vehicles, if armed with nuclear
24 weapons, would, correct?

25 General Berrier: Yes.

1 Senator Cotton: While we're on the topic of Russia, in
2 2019, General Ashley indicated that Russia is violating the
3 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. In the last year,
4 the Department reported that China may be doing the same.

5 General, do you agree that it is important that we
6 collect against and evaluate and inform our policymakers
7 about our adversaries' adherence to or violation of
8 international arms-control agreements?

9 General Berrier: Senator, yes, I do.

10 Senator Cotton: And do you assess that Russia and
11 China are violating the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
12 Treaty?

13 General Berrier: Senator, I would like to take that
14 question for the record and get back to you.

15 Senator Cotton: Director Haines, do you have an
16 opinion on that?

17 Mr. Haines: Thank you, Senator.

18 I don't believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
19 Treaty is in force, but like General Berrier, I think it
20 would be better for us to take it for the record and provide
21 you a comprehensive answer.

22 Senator Cotton: Okay. Thank you, both. I appreciate
23 your testimony.

24 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Cotton.

25 Let me now recognize Senator Sullivan.

1 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 And I appreciate the witnesses being here today.

3 Director Haines, congratulations on your confirmation.

4 General, good to see you again, as always.

5 Let me begin with kind of a basic question. Director,
6 do you track communications between private citizens and
7 known terrorists?

8 Mr. Haines: Senator, I think there are obviously parts
9 of the intelligence community that do track communications
10 that may be between terrorists and individual citizens.

11 Senator Sullivan: By his own admission, as a private
12 citizen, former Secretary of State John Kerry, communicated
13 several times with the foreign minister of Iran, the world's
14 largest state-sponsor of terrorism. Do you know what
15 happened in those calls or communications?

16 Mr. Haines: Thank you, Senator.

17 No, I was not privy to any of those calls.

18 Senator Sullivan: Maybe getting communications or a
19 readout of those calls from the intelligence community, I
20 think would be helpful, given the current controversies that
21 are surrounding those communications with one of our biggest
22 enemies and biggest state-sponsor of terrorism, so I would
23 like to follow-up with the intel community on that.

24 Let me ask another question. You and I spoke a lot
25 about it during your confirmation process, the prospects of

1 the United States becoming the world's energy superpower
2 again, producing more oil than Saudi Arabia, more natural
3 gas than Russia, more renewables than any other country, all
4 of the above energy. Do you believe that status as the
5 world's energy superpower and an exporter now of energy,
6 degrades or enhances our national security?

7 Mr. Haines: Thank you, Senator.

8 We did discuss this, and if I recall correctly, you
9 were looking at this question through the lens of whether or
10 not through our pursuit of renewables and so on, that that
11 might actually create challenges --

12 Senator Sullivan: No, I had asked and you had answered
13 yes, that being the world's energy superpower helps us.

14 Mr. Haines: Absolutely. Our natural resources,
15 including our energy piece help us.

16 Senator Sullivan: Do you agree with that, General,
17 being a net exporter of energy helps the United States'
18 national security foreign policy?

19 General Berrier: Senator, I don't really have an
20 opinion on that.

21 Senator Sullivan: These are not hard questions. Come
22 on.

23 General Berrier: It is not really related to defense
24 intelligence.

25 Senator Sullivan: Excuse me?

1 General Berrier: I said it is not really related to
2 defense intelligence or threats, so I'm not comfortable
3 answering that question.

4 Senator Sullivan: You don't think that whether we're a
5 net energy exporter or importer affects threats to the
6 United States, is that what you are saying as the head of
7 DIA?

8 General Berrier: No, what I am saying is our area of
9 expertise is foundational military intelligence about the
10 threats that our country faces. I don't study the export of
11 energy.

12 Senator Sullivan: Okay. Let me ask this. Do you
13 believe being a net importer of energy enhances or degrades
14 China's national security, Director?

15 Mr. Haines: Thank you, Senator.

16 Honestly, it is not something that I have studied
17 deeply, but I would imagine that their export of energy
18 under certain circumstances is a help and at the same time,
19 obviously, they will want to use a fair amount domestically,
20 as well, and it would depend on the particular circumstances
21 of what it is that you are looking at.

22 Senator Sullivan: Here is an article for the record,
23 Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit it. It is from the
24 Global Times. This is the Communist Party of China's
25 mouthpiece. U.S. status as net exporter of oil reminds

1 China of energy disadvantages.

2 Chairman Reed: Without objection.

3 [The information referred to follows:]

4 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Sullivan: So, the Chinese Community Party
2 clearly is thinking being a net importer of energy creates
3 disadvantages and they even mention it here, that the United
4 States, as a net exporter, it helps the United States'
5 national security. So, China's Communist Party believes
6 that.

7 I certainly hope our intel communities can just say it
8 definitively that, whether it is DIA or the DNA, that being
9 a net exporter of energy, all of the above energy, enhances
10 our national security and foreign policy.

11 Director you told me that during our confirmation
12 process. I would just like you to definitively state it
13 here. The reason I am doing this is we are undertaking
14 policies right now, the Biden administration, to restrict
15 the production of American energy, unilaterally. We are
16 importing more Russian oil right now than we have ever
17 before.

18 Is that good or bad for our national security, from
19 your perspective, relative to our relationship with Russia?

20 Mr. Haines: So, with respect, Senator, I am not trying
21 to be obtuse, it is just that, honestly, I think it depends
22 on the particular circumstances. And as a representative of
23 the intelligence community, what I try very hard to do is
24 provide you with what analysts assess, with respect to
25 particular situations, and give you that assessment so that

1 it can help your decision-making.

2 If you wish to provide us a question for the record
3 about some aspect of our energy piece and how that affects,
4 you know, foreign actors, by all means, we will absolutely
5 do our best to answer it.

6 Senator Sullivan: Okay. I will do that.

7 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan.

9 Senator Tuberville, if you are ready?

10 Senator Tuberville: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Thank you for being here today.

12 Director Haines, you made a statement a few minutes ago
13 that China is looking at us as declining. Would you clarify
14 that?

15 Mr. Haines: Thank you, Senator.

16 Just clarify it in the sense that --

17 Senator Tuberville: Declining. You said that China is
18 looking at us as, basically, a declining nation. Could you
19 clarify that?

20 Mr. Haines: Sure. Leadership has made various public
21 statements that indicate that they see the United States as
22 a declining power. It is obviously not what I believe, but
23 that is their perception.

24 Senator Tuberville: Okay. Thank you.

25 You know, many throw around the staff that the U.S.

1 dispensed more on defense than the next 10 or 12 countries
2 combined, yes or no, is that correct, General?

3 General Berrier: We spend a lot on defense, Senator.

4 Senator Tuberville: Director Haines, Xi Jinping
5 submits power in the CCP. How concerned are you that he is
6 surrounding by yes men?

7 And, General Berrier, based on your intelligence, does
8 this raise the threat level for a miscalculation, especially
9 with regard to Taiwan?

10 General Berrier: Senator, I think Xi is firmly in
11 control of the party of the military and every aspect of
12 Chinese society.

13 Senator Tuberville: We have had several generals tell
14 us that they know for a fact that he has yes men around him
15 and implemented that. Does that concern you, though? I
16 mean, is that different than has been in the past with other
17 dictators?

18 General Berrier: Senator, I will take that for the
19 record and come back to you.

20 Senator Tuberville: Okay. Thank you.

21 Director Haines, has North Korea taken any concrete
22 steps toward a complete, verifiable, and irreversible de-
23 nuclearization at all that we know of?

24 Mr. Haines: No, sir.

25 Senator Tuberville: Thank you.

1 You said a few minutes ago that there was an impact in
2 climate change in other countries across the world that is
3 causing migration. What countries are those?

4 Mr. Haines: Senator, we produced reports from the
5 Office of Director of National Intelligence over, I don't
6 know, I think the last 10 years, and we can make some of
7 those available to you, but what we indicate is that the
8 trend lines are such that over the next several decades,
9 particularly in certain parts of Africa, you will see
10 climate have an impact on, essentially, conditions in those
11 countries and these areas in Africa that is likely to
12 promote migration across the continent at pretty increased
13 levels, essentially.

14 Senator Tuberville: That has been forever, though,
15 right?

16 Mr. Haines: No, the climate change is actually
17 accelerating that.

18 Senator Tuberville: Okay. It seemed likely, as my
19 colleague, Senator King, said last week that a cyberattack
20 will be the precursor to the future of a great power
21 conflict.

22 Director Haines, what can the United States do to deter
23 our adversaries from cyberattacks, I mean, what is the best
24 thing that we can do now?

25 Mr. Haines: So, Senator, I think this is largely a

1 policy question that our policy folks work on, but I think
2 as a general matter, obviously, there are a variety of
3 theories of deterrence. Part of it is indicating redlines,
4 saying if you do this, we will do something that will cost
5 you, essentially, as a consequence. Working with coalition
6 partners, allies, to raise the cost, essentially, of taking
7 those actions, also, promoting resilience, generally, so the
8 effect of their actions are not as damaging as they might
9 otherwise be. A variety of things that can be done to
10 create, essentially, a framework of deterrence.

11 Senator Tuberville: Thank you.

12 Thank you, both.

13 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Tuberville.

15 Now, let me recognize via Webex, Senator Blackburn.

16 Senator Blackburn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 And I want to thank our witnesses today for being
18 there.

19 Director Haines, I have a question for you. One of the
20 things that we have seen and one of the things that we know
21 is that the intelligence community's reports periodic
22 reports are helpful when we are trying to quantify threats
23 and prepare for some of these black swan events, which
24 COVID-19 is one of those.

25 So, what I would like to know is, are there resources,

1 collection methods, authorities that would better and more
2 comprehensively support the work of the intel community's
3 ability to exercise some of this foresight?

4 And I ask this question in regard to Russia and China
5 and some of their participation. Also, if there is a way
6 for interagency share on some of these resources and
7 information.

8 Mr. Haines: Thank you, Senator, for the question. I
9 think we are going to be, obviously, submitting a budget in
10 the context of the President's budget and that will
11 indicate, I think, the resources that we are looking for to
12 try to promote the work that we do in this area. Beyond
13 that, I think it is probably best to leave it to the budget.

14 If there are particular thought that you have on things
15 that we can do better in this respect, please don't hesitate
16 to let us know, obviously.

17 Senator Blackburn: Well, this would need to be things
18 that you all say were missing or you need more of. And I
19 appreciate General Berrier's statement, and I will come to
20 you with this part of the question.

21 When we look at China and Russia and how they have
22 expanded their security ties, and I would be curious, to
23 what degree to you assess this closeness between Russia and
24 China, and I would add to that, Iran and North Korea, those
25 four, comprising a new axis of evil.

1 But, in what way do you attribute this to a growing
2 relationship between Putin and Xi and between the leadership
3 of these countries, and how do you assess these countries'
4 unwillingness to agree to a formal alliance?

5 General, to you.

6 General Berrier: Senator, thank you for that question.

7 We see some cooperation between China and Russia and I
8 would say that it is opportunistic and transactional. I
9 think neither country would prefer to have a deep military
10 alliance. It provides them flexibility not to actually have
11 that. There probably is some cooperation between all four
12 of the countries you mentioned on some level, and we can go
13 into more detail on that in the closed session.

14 But if you wouldn't mind, I would like to go back to
15 your question about the pandemic. You may know that DIA has
16 a National Center for Medical Intelligence and at this
17 organization at Ft. Detrick, we put analysts and scientists
18 together and we use a variety of methods from open-source
19 intelligence to sensitive reporting to try and understand
20 the pandemic and everything that has happened, as well as
21 medical phenomena going on around the world are. So, that
22 is a unique jewel in the crown for DIA and for the IC, quite
23 frankly.

24 I think we have the right authorities in place, and as
25 the Director said, in the budget, we will be looking for

1 continued funding for that center.

2 Senator Blackburn: Okay. Let me ask you this. When
3 we talk about Russia and China and naval cooperation, how do
4 you see this affecting the Indo-Pacific with Russia having
5 added 15 new warships and support vessels to their Pacific
6 fleet?

7 General Berrier: So, certainly something that we
8 should keep an eye on with our INDOPACOM partners.
9 Obviously, more forces there requires more intelligence,
10 surveillance, reconnaissance assets to keep an eye on it,
11 and we will watch out for additional partnership between
12 PLAN and Russian Navy forces.

13 Senator Blackburn: And I would also, and this might be
14 better for our closed session, but to know how you assess
15 Russia's geopolitical understanding of or participation in
16 China's Belt and Road Initiative.

17 General Berrier: I would be happy to discuss that in
18 the closed session.

19 Senator Blackburn: Thank you.

20 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Blackburn.

22 Now, let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Manchin.

23 [No response.]

24 Chairman Reed: Senator Manchin is obviously having
25 some problems communicating. Apparently, Senator Manchin is

1 not available at this time to Webex his questions.

2 Since there are no other members seeking recognition,
3 let me thank the witnesses for their testimony in this open
4 session. And immediately upon adjournment of the open
5 session, we will retire to our SVC-217 for a classified
6 briefing on these issues.

7 Again, thank you, Madam Director. Thank you, General.
8 And I will declare the open session adjourned.

9 [Whereupon, at 10:46 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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