

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Tonya P. Wilkerson
Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

Duties, Qualifications, and Relationships

- 1. If confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), what do you believe would be your most critical duties and responsibilities?**

I believe that the most critical duty and responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) is supporting the Secretary of Defense in executing his intelligence and security responsibilities and authorities including under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code.

I understand that the responsibilities of the USD(I&S) are assigned in DoD Directive 5143.01 and comprise: serving as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters; exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Security Agency / Central Security Service (NSA / CSS), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA); establishing policy and priorities for, and providing oversight of, the defense intelligence and security enterprises; exercising oversight of personnel policy to ensure that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are staffed, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DoD intelligence components that are also elements of the intelligence community are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that certain sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing the implementation of assigned DoD security policies and programs to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; and serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program.

- 2. What is your understanding of the differences between the title 10 and title 50 duties of the USD(I&S)?**

My understanding is that the USD(I&S) supports the Secretary of Defense in fulfilling all of the Secretary's title 10 and title 50 statutory responsibilities in the areas of intelligence and security and that the duties of the USD(I&S) are prescribed in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01. Under Title 10 this includes providing overall direction and supervision for policy program planning and execution, and use of resources for DoD activities that are part of the Military Intelligence Program and for personnel security, physical security, industrial

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security, and the protection of classified information and controlled unclassified information. Pursuant to subsection 3038(a) of title 50, the Secretary of Defense has the following responsibilities, which are to be conducted in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence: (1) ensure that the budgets of the intelligence community (IC) elements within the Department of Defense (DoD) are adequately funded to the overall DoD intelligence needs; (2) ensure the implementation of the policies and resource decisions of the Director of National Intelligence by DoD Components within the National Intelligence Program (NIP); (3) ensure that DoD tactical intelligence activities complement and are compatible with intelligence activities funded by the NIP; (4) ensure that the IC elements within DoD are responsive and timely with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military forces; (5) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication among the DoD intelligence activities; and (6) ensure that DoD intelligence activities are conducted jointly where appropriate.

3. What leadership and management experience do you possess that you would apply to your service as USD(I&S), if confirmed?

I have had the privilege of more than 35 years of public service. As a member of the CIA Senior Intelligence Service for 14 years, I held senior positions in two Defense Intelligence Enterprise Agencies, NGA and NRO, as well as CIA. My experiences include operations, science and technology, acquisition, research and development, and resource management. More than a decade of my career has been dedicated to NRO mission operations and leveraging my expertise in sensors to ensure capabilities were optimized to meet intelligence needs. As the Director, NRO Mission Operations Directorate, I worked with multiple Defense Intelligence Enterprise and Intelligence Community (IC) agencies to deliver multi-intelligence data. As a senior leader, I have applied my technical expertise, combined with my background in space operations, to leverage capabilities to deliver of timely intelligence to the warfighter, policy makers, and senior government leaders.

If confirmed, I am uniquely postured to collaborate and partner across the DIE, IC and Military Departments bringing to bear an ability to represent Department requirements and ensure the delivery of timely intelligence to the warfighter. I would also use my deep understanding of resource management to ensure the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise (DISE) operates in an effective and efficient manner.

4. Please provide an example of a situation in which you led and brought to conclusion a management improvement/change initiative in a complex organization.

In my current role as Deputy Director, NGA, I am the senior champion for delivering results against NGA's strategic objective to "Strengthen the stewardship of GEOINT resources." I developed a multi-year approach to enhance agency resource management by implementing changes to optimize Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) processes. I recognized the organizational structure, processes and business cadence needed to change in order to ensure consistent, repeatable processes that yielded timely and accurate financial management artifacts.

In coordination with the agency's senior leadership team, I realigned organizations, clarified roles and responsibilities, matured concepts of operations for the PPBE phases, filled key Financial Management senior positions and established a new governance structure focused on resource management. The intent of the governance framework was to ensure shared awareness and deliver recommendations to the Director, NGA to make decisions related to the administration of resources and submissions to external stakeholders. The changes implemented have strengthened NGA's resource management processes by removing disconnects between the planning, programming and budgeting phases, improving clarity of the budget justification submissions, establishing a tighter linkage between acquisition activities and PPBE processes and improving the timeliness and accuracy of responses to external stakeholders.

5. What is your experience across the domain of intelligence matters? What is your experience across the domain of security matters?

My career has included a number of experiences in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and broader IC with increasing responsibility providing a foundation steeped in understanding intelligence matters. From acquisition and operations of reconnaissance satellites to developing technical collection strategies to address hard targets, each of these roles prepared me for additional responsibility. As the Deputy Director, NGA, I am routinely engaged in both intelligence and security matters. As NGA provides timely, relevant and actionable geospatial intelligence, I have daily insight into the Executive Branch's intelligence requirements and how GEOINT contributions assist in satisfying these requirements. With respect to security, as the Deputy Director, I am responsible for ensuring that there is effective oversight and compliance with security standards as it pertains to the NGA workforce and mission.

At CIA, I was a member of the inaugural leadership team of an office focused on enhancing integration across the multiple mission areas. I delivered integrated technical collection strategies that leveraged capabilities across the CIA and greater IC. I developed and delivered end-to-end systems solutions to address enduring intelligence challenges.

I recognize the importance of the USD (I&S) security mission and leadership of the DISE. As the Chief of an NRO Operations Facility, I was responsible for all matters supporting the intelligence mission as well as ensuring the security of the facility to include addressing personnel, physical and industrial security matters and ensuring the protection of classified information.

6. If confirmed, are there any actions you would take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the USD(I&S)?

If confirmed, I would continue to build upon my broad existing working relationships and network across the broader IC and security communities, including those within the ODNI,

the other IC elements, and other defense elements and interagency partners within the security community.

7. If confirmed, what specific duties might you expect the Secretary of Defense to prescribe for you, particularly in light of the lines of effort set forth in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS)?

If confirmed, I believe that my duties align with the Secretary's 2022 NDS. This would include posturing the DISE against the pacing threat of China, countering Russia's unprovoked war in Ukraine and malign influence activities, and the persistent regional threat posed by Iran and their funded proxy forces, and the increasingly ambitious North Korea, while fostering the expansion of cooperation with other Departments and Agencies and international partnerships to address national security priorities, more specifically concerning Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. Additionally, the Department must protect our personnel at home and abroad, a task that includes developing a collaborative and accountable culture that does not accept harassment or violent extremism within its military and civilian ranks.

8. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security?

If confirmed, I understand the duties and responsibilities of the USD(I&S) to be sufficiently broad such that I expect Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security would serve as a full partner across the whole portfolio within the limits of policy and the law.

9. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as USD(I&S) fulfills the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

In accordance with the U.S. Constitution and U.S. law, I am committed to civilian control of the Armed Forces. I recognize that the Department's civilian and military personnel, together, with the support of DoD contractors, enable our mission success, and civilian control of the Armed Forces ensures accountability to the will of the people through our elected representatives. If confirmed, in collaboration with the Joint Staff, I am committed to providing leadership to our military services and the combatant commands.

10. How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)? On what matters would you expect to collaborate with the ODNI, if confirmed?

I am aware that the OUSD(I&S) works closely with the ODNI. The partnership and integration between OUSD(I&S) and ODNI enables the IC to deliver both national and military intelligence support to policymakers and warfighters on threats to our national

security. If confirmed, I will seek to continue to strengthen the partnership between OUSD(I&S) and ODNI.

I am also aware that the USD(I&S) is dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence within the ODNI. Additionally, as a principal member of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (PAC), the USD(I&S) works with the DNI, who is the Security Executive Agent and also a principal member of the PAC.

If confirmed, I am committed to fulfilling these responsibilities through collaboration with my counterparts within ODNI and the DISE components.

11. What is your understanding of the relationship and division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)), particularly with regard to policy and programs for information operations, including military deception and operations security (OPSEC)?

My understanding is that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) is the Principal Staff Assistant for Information Operations (IO), and that the USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant for DoD deception activities and operations security, which includes responsibility for coordination of DoD IO activities with the IC, as well as the coordinated development and implementation of DoD policy, programs, and guidance for DoD deception, influence and perception management.

12. In your view, what would be the appropriate relationship between the USD(I&S) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to providing operational intelligence, counterintelligence, and security support to the warfighter?

In my view, the relationship between the USD(I&S) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one of mutual support and consultation to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise provides the warfighters with the best intelligence possible, which enables the Chairman to provide the best military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

13. How are responsibilities for the oversight of the activities and programs of special operations forces delineated between the OUSD(I&S) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC))?

I understand that USD(I&S) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) acting together are the primary oversight officials for all U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) intelligence and intelligence-related activities and programs. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this close partnership, working with ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure that our oversight of USSOF intelligence and intelligence-related activities and programs is coordinated and collaborative.

14. Are there any programs currently overseen by the OUSD(I&S) that would be more appropriately overseen by ASD(SOLIC), in your view?

I am unaware of any such programs at this time. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure that together we provide the Secretary of Defense with the best organizational alignment to accomplish U.S. national security objectives.

15. How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between OUSD(I&S) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) in regard to both unclassified and classified contract efforts?

I understand the relationship between OUSD(I&S) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) is one of cooperation and collaboration. I am also aware that the Department is examining its oversight of classified contracting, and that OUSD(I&S) and OUSD(A&S) are closely engaged in this effort. Lastly, OUSD(A&S) will be a key teammate in the OUSD(I&S) effort to get the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS) program on track after recent acquisition delays. If confirmed, I look forward to partnering with the USD(A&S) to ensure that DoD acquisition programs receive the intelligence needed to acquire superior defense capabilities and that appropriate consideration is given to the central role of security throughout the acquisition process to protect the integrity of our acquisitions in the face of the persistent threat of compromise by our adversaries.

16. How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the DOD Chief Information Officer, particularly with respect to the cybersecurity mission; developing interoperability requirements applicable to information systems architectures for processing intelligence and counterintelligence information; and the certification of intelligence information systems?

I view the relationship between the OUSD(I&S) and the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) as one predicated on collaboration and partnership to ensure synchronization between security policy makers and information technology service providers. I understand that the DoD CIO advises the Secretary of Defense on information technology, including National Security Systems and defense business systems, cybersecurity, and develops DoD strategy and policy for all DoD information technology and information systems. In addition, I understand that OUSD(I&S) is responsible for development and oversight of information security and physical security policy, who also serves as the National Manager for National Security Systems. It is in the interest of OUSD(I&S) to have a close relationship with DoD CIO to leverage technology to protect information, spaces, facilities, and personnel. If confirmed, I will ensure OUSD(I&S) maintains a close partnership with the DoD CIO to enable the necessary security architecture to protect U.S. Government information, including intelligence and counterintelligence information, while effectively enabling the mission.

17. What is your understanding of the relationship and division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

(USD(P&R)) for the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS)? For the identification of DOD language capability requirements?

It is my understanding that the OUSD(I&S) establishes policy for the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System in partnership with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)). I also understand that OUSD(P&R) coordinates with OUSD(I&S) and the IC to identify and prioritize DoD foreign language capability requirements. If confirmed, I will examine the relationship between OUSD(I&S) and OUSD(P&R) to include the process for identifying DoD language capability requirements.

18. What is your understanding of the relationship and division of responsibilities between USD(I&S) and the DOD Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer, both with respect to the identification and adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, as well as the responsibility to coordinate data, including data repositories, across DOD?

It is my understanding that the CDAO has been tasked to focus on accelerating the DoD's adoption of data, analytics, and AI to enable decision advantage. This includes accelerating the transition of the Department to a data-centric organization. The Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise should play a critical role in supporting these activities and if I am confirmed, I will collaborate with the CDAO on major Department investments in data, analytics, and AI technology initiatives as well as other stakeholders such as USD(R&E). Furthermore, I will ensure that the CDAO has a robust relationship with the IC, to include the IC's Chief Data Officer. Lastly, I understand that the CDAO will be a key teammate in the OUSD(I&S) effort to get the National Background Investigation Systems program on track after recent acquisition delays.

19. How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the heads of the Intelligence Components of the Military Departments?

I understand that the OUSD(I&S) staff works closely with the heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence components of the Military Departments. I understand that the USD(I&S) provides input to the Secretaries of the Military Departments on the duty performance of the senior intelligence officer within each Military Department.

The USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense with authority delegated from the Secretary of Defense to establish policy for DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. The Directors for Defense Intelligence within the OUSD(I&S) have specific programmatic responsibilities and support the Under Secretary in carrying out the responsibilities assigned and exercising the authorities delegated to the USD(I&S) by the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority, direction, and control over all components within their respective Departments. The heads of the intelligence and

counterintelligence components within the Military Departments are under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Military Department and subject to policy oversight of the OUSD(I&S).

20. What do you perceive to be the role of the OUSD(I&S) with regard to the Reserve Component intelligence elements of Military Services?

I understand that, in accordance with DoD Directive 5143.01, which outlines the responsibilities and functions, relationships, and authorities of the USD(I&S), OUSD(I&S) develops and provides policy guidance, resource advocacy, and oversight for the integration of Reserve Component intelligence elements, and ensures the Department effectively employs and resources Reserve Component intelligence elements to best support the NDS. The programmatic role of OUSD(I&S) is the same with respect to the Active and Reserve Components of the Military Services. Like the Active Components, the Reserve Components' intelligence elements are under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the relevant Military Department in which they are located and subject to policy oversight of the OUSD(I&S).

21. What is your understanding of the USD(I&S)'s responsibility and authority for the management and oversight of Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and National Intelligence Program (NIP) funding? How do the processes employed by the USD(I&S) in the execution of these responsibilities differ from the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process applicable to all other DOD organizations and funding?

USD(I&S) executes the Secretary's statutory responsibilities regarding the budgets of the DOD IC elements, including ensuring that the budgets of the DoD IC elements are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the Department. Further, as the MIP Executive Agent, the USD(I&S) is responsible for the management and oversight of the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The USD(I&S) executes the functions for the NIP of the Department, as delegated by the Secretary of Defense, and as the Director of Defense Intelligence for ODNI, has visibility into the NIP through participation in the ODNI resource decision forums. Additionally, I understand that the DNI and the USD(I&S) jointly issue intelligence programming guidance to closely synchronize NIP and MIP-funded programs to ensure that the Department's priorities are communicated to the IC. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ODNI in ensuring that DoD intelligence requirements are supported within the NIP budget.

With respect to the PPBE process, it is my understanding the USD(I&S) is a full participant in the Department's PPBE process and that military intelligence requirements compete with the other DoD requirements.

22. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take to develop and sustain an open, transparent, and productive relationship between Congress—the Senate Armed

Services and Senate Appropriations Committees, in particular—and the OUSD(I&S) and the Defense Agencies under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S)?

If confirmed, I look forward to engaging with the defense oversight committees on a routine basis to discuss the Department's activities that are subject to their oversight, including defense intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related activities. I am committed to maintaining open lines of communication with Congress to ensure accurate and consistent information is shared from the OUSD(I&S) and the defense agencies under USD(I&S) authority.

23. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure both that this Committee is provided with the notifications required under section 2723 of title 10, U.S. Code, and that any such notification is accurate, complete, and timely?

I am committed to keeping Congress informed involving activities that fall under the USD(I&S)'s responsibility under DoD Directive 5143.01, including fulfilling the notification requirements in 10 U.S.C. 2723. Where an activity involves activities related to nuclear, chemical, and biological security, I will also consult with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as appropriate, and notify Congress, as required by section 2723. If confirmed, I will ensure such notifications are accurate, complete, and timely.

Major Challenges and Priorities

24. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you would face if confirmed as the USD(I&S) and what specific actions would you take to address each of these challenges?

I consider supporting the NDS our most important responsibility. I anticipate strategic competition with China, deterring Russian aggression, and managing other persistent threats, including those from North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations will be the most significant challenges. The organizations that comprise the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprises have key responsibilities critical to the accomplishment of the 2022 NDS. They are responsible for providing intelligence that enables decision advantage for U.S. warfighters, decision makers, and our Allies and partners. The Defense Security Enterprise must also safeguard personnel, information, operations, resources, technologies, and facilities against a wide range of threats and challenges.

If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring the DISE further strengthens and provides the capabilities necessary to defend the homeland and our allies and partners, deter strategic attacks, deter aggression and prepare for conflict when necessary, and support building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

Supervision, and Oversight of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise

The USD(I&S) is vested with responsibility for the overall direction and supervision of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise (DISE) in the execution of intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters across DOD. Subject to USD(I&S) oversight, responsibility for executing policies and programs in these domains vests primarily in the Military Departments and Services, elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Agencies.

25. What is your understanding of the role of the OUSD(I&S) in coordinating the activities of the DISE?

Intelligence and security are mutually reinforcing mission areas supporting NDS objectives. The Department must understand the intentions, capabilities, and activities of strategic competitors and other adversaries. Similarly, the security apparatus must safeguard our personnel, information, capabilities, and infrastructures, both physical and logical. The combination of these disciplines enables DoD's contributions to the United States' enduring advantage.

26. In your view, does the USD(I&S) have the authority, organizational structure, and resources to provide appropriate oversight of the DISE? If not, what additional authorities or resources does the OUSD(I&S) require, in your view?

From my current vantage point, I believe the USD(I&S) has the authority and organizational structure to conduct appropriate oversight. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the resources of OUSD(I&S) to ensure that the resources and authorities necessary for oversight are available.

National Defense Strategy

27. In your view, does the current NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment, including prioritization of the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies? Please explain your answer.

Yes. I believe the 2022 NDS accurately assesses the current strategic environment. China represents DoD's pacing challenge, given the increasing scope and scale of its military modernization, and its disregard for the rules-based approach to international relations. Russia continues to present acute challenges, especially following its unprovoked 2022 further invasion of Ukraine and in light of the emerging nexus between Russia, the PRC, Iran, and North Korea. In addition, DoD must remain vigilant about the persistent threat posed by violent extremist organizations.

28. In your view, what role(s) must the DISE play in the implementation of the NDS?

The DISE continues to play a vital role supporting the NDS. The Enterprise must support decision makers, help ensure decision advantage for the U.S. allies and partners and safeguard personnel, information, operations, resources, technologies, and facilities against a wide range of threats and challenges.

29. How would you assess the current readiness and capabilities of the DISE to execute the NDS?

I believe the DISE is well-postured to support the Department's execution of the NDS. If confirmed, I will conduct my own assessment of the enterprise's readiness and seek additional ways to improve its ability to execute the NDS.

30. Does the OUSD(I&S) have the analytic tools and expertise to assist you, if confirmed, in evaluating the readiness of the DISE to engage effectively across the spectrum of challenges presented by the current strategic environment—from low intensity, gray-zone conflicts to protracted, high-intensity warfare with major-power rivals? Please explain your answer.

I understand that OUSD(I&S) possesses the expertise, analytic tools, and authorities to assist in evaluating readiness of the DISE to engage effectively across the spectrum of challenges presented by the current strategic environment. If confirmed, I understand that I will be able to use a very experienced resource analysis team, with strong relationships across the DISE.

31. How is the OUSD(I&S) positioned to address the intelligence challenges posed by emerging technologies, such as AI, quantum sensing and information systems, energetic materials, computational social science, and biotechnology?

The Under Secretary for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E))—acting as the DoD Chief Technology Officer (CTO)—has identified each of these technology areas as Critical Technology Areas. I understand the OUSD(I&S) engages with stakeholders in each of these Critical Technology Areas to understand their impact on intelligence, but also the opportunities they provide to the DISE. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that OUSD(I&S) continues to work closely with other DoD stakeholders to address the intelligence challenges and opportunities posed by emerging technologies.

32. What relationships do you have with the DOD science and technology enterprise, like the Strategic Capabilities Office, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit, or the service laboratories to identify, characterize and develop new technologies needed by the DISE?

I understand that OUSD(I&S) works closely with each of these organizations. If confirmed, I look forward to being briefed on these activities and learning how best I can support their success.

33. What do you believe are the main resource or capability shortfalls that could hamper the DISE's execution of the NDS?

I appreciate Congress's continued support for the DISE and its execution of the NDS. It is my understanding that the current Fiscal Year 2024 enacted budget and associated supplemental appropriations, along with the Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget Request, continue to support and deliver NDS priorities which position the DISE to defend the homeland, sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, and prepare the Joint Force to prevail in conflict. If confirmed, I will assess the DISE budget execution and requirements to make my own recommendations to the Secretary on how best to accelerate intelligence transformation to deliver decision advantage at speed and scale.

34. If confirmed, how would you propose to address any gaps or shortfalls in the ability of the DISE to meet the demands placed on it by the NDS?

If confirmed, I will work across the Department to ensure any capability gaps and shortfalls are identified and resource requirements are considered throughout the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. In addition, I would partner closely with the DNI to align the Military Intelligence Program and National Intelligence Program (NIP) to combine for greatest effect.

35. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would you advise the Secretary of Defense to make in the Department's implementation of the NDS with respect to intelligence and security?

If confirmed, I commit to receiving full briefs on how the Department is implementing the National Defense Strategy, with particular focus on the efforts of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise and will recommend appropriate changes to the Secretary of Defense.

Strengthening Alliances and Attracting New Partners

Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict.

36. How would you characterize your familiarity with the leadership of cooperative foreign defense establishments, the intelligence and security services of foreign governments, and intelligence and security-related international organizations?

My Intelligence Community experience has afforded me familiarity with cooperative foreign governments; their defense, intelligence, and security services; their leadership; and related international organizations. If confirmed, I look forward to strengthening U.S. ties with defense and intelligence counterparts around the globe and collaborating on areas of shared interest and concern.

37. If confirmed as USD(I&S), what specific actions would you take to strengthen and synchronize existing intelligence and counterintelligence relationships with foreign governments and international organizations?

I believe that allies and partners are force multipliers that enable DoD to execute its National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I commit to strengthening defense intelligence and counterintelligence relationships with allies and partners, including ensuring we have the intelligence sharing relationships needed. I also commit to working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and DNI to ensure synchronization of U.S. partnerships and appropriate prioritization of new partnership outreach.

38. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in rendering decisions on the disclosure and release of intelligence to foreign governments and international organizations, including in support of combatant commanders' expressed desire for better intelligence and intelligence sharing to counter foreign malign activities?

I understand that the National Disclosure Policy sets forth the factors that must be weighed for the disclosure of U.S. classified military information, including military intelligence, to appropriate foreign partners, and that policy for sharing military intelligence is issued by the USD(I&S). If confirmed, I will support combatant command requirements for release of military and national intelligence to counter foreign malign activities consistent with established procedures for such release.

39. In your view, is the DISE positioned to understand, characterize and assess the economic competition aspects of great power competition to inform strategies to counter predatory economic activity by adversaries? If not, what improvements would you suggest?

If confirmed, I commit to understanding how the DISE informs strategies to counter predatory economic activity by adversaries and will work across the DISE to ensure appropriate insights are available to policy makers on the impact of economic competition on U.S. defense and intelligence equities.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS)

Per section 181 of title 10, U.S. Code, the JROC is vested with the responsibility to assess joint military capabilities; establish and approve joint performance requirements that ensure interoperability between military capabilities; and identify new joint military capabilities based on advances in technology and concepts of operation. The JCIDS process was established to address overlap and duplication in Military Services' programs by providing the information the JROC needs to identify the capabilities and associated operational performance requirements needed by the joint warfighter.

40. How do you assess the effectiveness of the JROC and JCIDS in identifying and establishing joint warfighter capability requirements in the domains of military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security?

I am aware that the JROC and JCIDS use authoritative threat assessments from the Intelligence Community to inform all Joint Force capability requirements and to guide requirements and capability development, including in the areas of military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. The USD(I&S), as an advisor to the JROC and its subordinate boards, provides advice that supports effective intelligence-related capability requirements and associated key performance parameters.

If confirmed, I will ensure the close coordination between my staff and JROC members, so the JCIDS process continues to validate effective military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security requirements.

41. In your view, have recent acquisition reforms that shifted authorities to the Military Services affected the JROC's ability to assess joint performance requirements in the military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security domains?

I understand that the recent reforms have transferred acquisition Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) from USD(A&S) to the Services, including for intelligence programs. I understand, however, that those reforms have not fundamentally altered how DoD assesses and validates requirements, to include those in the military intelligence, counterintelligence and security programs. The JROC continues its oversight of the JCIDS process and the assessment and validation of effective joint performance requirements in the areas of military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. Additionally, an Intelligence Support Certification is still required to complete the requirements validation process needed prior to an Acquisition Milestone Decision.

If confirmed, I will ensure the close coordination between my staff and JROC members to ensure the JCIDS process continues to effectively validate military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security requirements.

42. What recommendations do you have for improving the requirements process, including the JROC, to be more agile and responsive to innovative technologies and warfighting concepts, including applying real world lessons from Ukraine?

I understand that the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense have an integrated process to rapidly identify, evaluate, and direct rapid acquisition of urgently needed capabilities.

If confirmed, I look forward to being more fully briefed and supporting the Department's efforts to develop innovative technologies and warfighting concepts.

Given the role that National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) assets have in providing intelligence for warfighting functions, the JROC reviews NRO acquisition programs to ensure DOD requirements are being met.

43. If confirmed, how would you ensure that NRO's close relationship with the JROC continues?

Consideration of both DOD and IC requirements is central to the USD(I&S) role. It is my understanding that the OUSD(I&S) plays a central role in bridging DOD and IC requirements by directly facilitating the common gatekeeping function between the Joint JCIDS and the Intelligence Community Capability Requirements (ICCR) Process.

If confirmed, I will work to maintain open communication throughout this process and work closely with the Joint Staff and Intelligence Community during the requirements validation process for NRO capabilities.

The streamlined middle-tier acquisition authorities enacted in Section 804 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) sought to speed fielding of advanced technologies and systems.

44. What is your opinion of the effects of efforts to use middle-tier acquisition authorities in intelligence-, counterintelligence-, or security-related acquisitions?

I support the rapid development and fielding of new capabilities to meet emerging intelligence and security requirements.

If confirmed, I will work closely with my staff and other DoD stakeholders in overseeing the application of middle-tier acquisition authorities to ensure intelligence and security acquisitions are in compliance with governmental regulations and directives.

Intelligence Support to the Warfighter

45. If confirmed, how would you balance the need for the combat support Defense intelligence agencies to provide intelligence support to the warfighter with the need to provide intelligence support to policy makers?

Balancing the intelligence needs of the warfighter and policy makers is central to the OUSD(I&S) mission. If confirmed, I will deepen collaboration between DoD and IC to ensure the Defense Intelligence Enterprise continues to satisfy all intelligence requirements for both our warfighters and policy makers.

46. In your view, what opportunities exist across the Intelligence Community to improve intelligence support to the warfighter? If confirmed, what would you do to leverage these opportunities?

I believe it is essential for the Intelligence Community to continue to identify opportunities to enhance support to the warfighter. If confirmed, I will closely coordinate with the combatant commanders to deepen my understanding of their requirements and challenges, and I would engage leaders within the Intelligence Community to obtain support to meet those warfighter needs.

47. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the geographic combatant commands are adequately assessing and prioritizing their intelligence needs?

I understand that OUSD(I&S) conducts multiple engagements with the Combatant Commands to include regular meetings with all Combatant Command J2s on a variety of issues in order to maintain a current understanding of regional risks and intelligence priorities. If confirmed, I will promptly establish my own relationships with the Combatant Commanders and ensure that OUSD(I&S) supports their needs.

48. In your view, are the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers and Service Intelligence Centers organized and resourced to most effectively support warfighter requirements under the NDS, to include support to near-real time, multi-sensor joint detection, tracking, and targeting for the combatant commands? What changes may be required to optimize cooperative, cross-agency targeting support?

If confirmed, I will evaluate how to best resource the Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) and the Service Intelligence Centers (SICs) to support the NDS. I understand that some of the JIOCs are currently being evaluated to determine the appropriate staffing to meet the mission requirements of the Combatant Commands. It would be incumbent upon the OUSD(I&S) to ensure that the Commands are resourced in a way that helps them meet their requirements. If confirmed, I will support periodic reviews and realignment of resources, where appropriate, to ensure priorities are met and resources are effectively employed to support the warfighter.

49. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations forces different from those carried out by the Intelligence Community?

I understand that SOF intelligence operations are focused on DoD requirements and priorities. These priorities may differ from those of the IC in that they are sometimes more tactical, focused on support to military operations or preparation of military operations. This intelligence enables a commander to make decisions that reduces risk to force and can create opportunities for further collection and exploitation. It is essential that SOF intelligence operations are conducted pursuant to applicable law and policy, and subject to the requisite intelligence oversight rules, consistent with all DoD intelligence activities.

50. If confirmed, how would you work across the Defense Department, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Intelligence Community to ensure that

intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are properly coordinated with activities carried out by the Intelligence Community?

I understand that special operations forces intelligence activities are closely coordinated with the intelligence community as required by applicable law, policy, and agreements. If confirmed, I would continue to work closely with the ASD SO/LIC, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, other DoD senior intelligence officials, and where applicable, other agencies to ensure special operations forces units comply with all applicable policies and directives.

51. What is your understanding of efforts by the OUSD(I&S) to develop and implement systems for the use of AI to bring greater efficiencies to intelligence analysis, including opportunities to condense the time required by a human analyst to locate and prioritize potential targets and convert those observations to actionable intelligence for input to military decision making?

I have seen how OUSD(I&S)'s ongoing AI efforts are accelerating through the CSAs and Service intelligence formations and security programs, developing the means to use AI technologies to reduce decision-making timelines in an environment of increasing volumes of data, while continuing to comply with U.S. laws and policies. First, through its relationship with the CDAO, OUSD(I&S) is overseeing and funding DISE components to deliver data-centric and AI-enabled decision-making tools. In addition, within the DISE specifically, OUSD(I&S) is researching generative and other AI tools to accelerate and enhance intelligence and security reporting. Successful AI efforts free analysts for critical projects and intelligence assessments.

52. How is OUSD(I&S) looking at threats from AI, such as uses of generative AI for misinformation and disinformation campaigns, or the use of data poisoning to disrupt our AI systems?

I understand that OUSD(I&S) is involved in looking at these issues and other related AI matters in order to understand how our adversaries may use these capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about their efforts, and briefing the Committee in closed session. Trusted AI is one of the DoD's highest priorities in AI development and fielding, and I will closely work with OUSD(R&E)/ASD(CT) who is devoted to development and implementation of trusted AI and Autonomy components and systems.

Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security

53. What is your assessment of current and anticipated counterintelligence threats to DOD? Which threats do you assess to be the most concerning and why?

China, Russia, and Iran are more aggressive and more capable in their nefarious activity than ever before. These nations seek to challenge America's military advantage, employing a growing range of tactics, techniques, and procedures to advance their interests and to harm the United States. These nations will persist with sophisticated foreign intelligence operations below the level of armed conflict using coercion, subversion, malign influence, disinformation, cyber and economic espionage, traditional spies, and non-traditional collectors.

If I confirmed, I will continue to implement the DoD CI Strategy as a multifaceted approach to confronting foreign intelligence entity threats and protecting our military's competitive edge by building capacity, aligning mission and resources, and strengthening the Department's execution of full spectrum CI.

54. What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the OUSD(I&S) to provide strategic direction and oversight of implementation of counterintelligence policy, programs, guidance, and training to ensure they are responsive to validated DOD and national counterintelligence priorities? What changes, if any, in these roles and responsibilities would you recommend, if confirmed?

I understand that one of the roles and responsibilities of the OUSD(I&S) is to implement the NDS through policy, guidance and direction, advocacy, and oversight of DoD counterintelligence to counter foreign intelligence entities threatening our national security.

I understand that through the DoD CI Strategy signed by the USD(I&S) in 2021, the Department is fundamentally shifting its CI activities to a more offensive posture, accepting greater risk with our operational, intelligence, security, and law enforcement partners to more effectively confront advanced, persistent foreign intelligence threats to America's military advantage.

If confirmed, I will continue to implement this strategy, and employ DoD CI forces in partnership with the FBI and the other elements of the IC to ensure national priorities are addressed and the community continues to evolve to meet the future needs of the Department in this dynamic environment.

55. In your view, how has the Department's security posture benefitted from the integration of the intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement functions under the auspices of a single Under Secretary?

In my experience, integrating policy oversight of intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement, along with foundational security functions, supports decision advantage in an ever-evolving complex threat environment.

This strong collaboration produces a wider range of tools to respond to threats and ensure the protection of the Department's people, information, and resources.

56. Does the integration of these functions under a single official raise civil liberties concerns? If so, what do you believe to be the most effective way to address those concerns?

No, it does not. Proper and continual consideration of how the Department's activities might affect civil liberties is fundamental to our constitutional oath. With this in mind, prudent and deliberate integration of these functions reinforces the distinction between these functions and the responsibilities to prevent gaps and carefully manage aspects of overlap.

It is my belief that the Department's priorities benefit greatly from the integration of the intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement functions under the USD(I&S). I understand that it has resulted in a more robust environment of information sharing that benefits the Department in our national security efforts.

If confirmed, I will ensure that all intelligence and security activities, including counterintelligence and law enforcement are conducted throughout the Department in a manner that respects civil liberties and protects any right or privilege secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

57. Does the USD(I&S) have adequate authorities and resources to execute the law enforcement policy function? If not, what additional authorities or resources are required, in your view?

I understand the Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security portfolio within OUSD(I&S) has responsibility for the law enforcement policy function.

Although I have not been fully briefed on current activities or resources, if confirmed, I will review this portfolio and ensure OUSD(I&S) has the right alignment of authorities and resources to perform the policy oversight function with a consistent and unified approach to LE within department.

Personnel Security and Insider Threat

The USD(I&S) is accountable for managing and overseeing DOD's insider threat, personnel security, and the National Industrial Security programs. DOD has experienced devastating attacks from insider threats—attacks that have led to the death and injury of DOD personnel, as well as to the loss of highly-classified information critical to national security.

58. What is your current assessment of the ability of DCSA to meet its assigned responsibilities for personnel security and insider threat mitigation across DOD?

I understand that DCSA is the largest provider of end-to-end vetting services for the Federal government and has done a commendable job embracing the Trusted Workforce 2.0

reforms, despite challenges with the personnel vetting IT system, the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS). DCSA is also a key capability provider of insider threat services to the Component analytic hubs, providing rapid and effective analysis and mitigation support to Component Commanders.

If confirmed, I will ensure DCSA is best positioned to provide effective and efficient personnel vetting and insider threat information to the Department and Federal partners. Additionally, I will ensure the Department continues the commitment to deliver NBIS on an efficient cost, schedule, and performance plan to enhance the end-to-end vetting process and to ensure robust information sharing to manage risk and enable agencies' missions.

59. If confirmed, how would you ensure that DCSA is highly responsive to the needs of the USD(A&S) for vetting DOD contractors in responsibility determinations?

I understand that DCSA vets' contractors in accordance with regulatory requirements for the National Industrial Security Program to determine whether granting the contractor personnel and the companies themselves access to classified information is in line with national security interests.

If confirmed, I will ensure OUSD(I&S) stays engaged with DCSA on timelines to review requests for clearances so that companies and personnel throughout the supply chain can securely deliver in accordance with the requirements of their contract.

60. What is your understanding of any challenges in achieving reciprocity of clearances and access to classified information across government components and their contractors?

I am aware of concerns about reciprocity, particularly with IC agencies. My understanding of the concern is that any delays in reciprocity are generally related to enhanced eligibility requirements of some IC agencies, such as polygraphs, for access to especially sensitive information.

If confirmed, I will ensure DoD personnel vetting policies and processes are aligned to Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiatives and tracked through a performance management system to ensure effective transfer of trust and the mobility of the Federal workforce, as well as our contractors and others in private industry who are granted clearances.

61. How, if at all, should the Department change its data ownership and governance policies to facilitate the sharing of data across DOD intelligence, counter-intelligence, law enforcement, physical security, personnel security, human resources, network monitoring, and cybersecurity organizations?

While I have not been completely briefed on the full extent of the security portfolio, I support enterprise data management and information sharing of security information with mission partners.

As the Deputy Director of NGA, I am keenly aware of the Department's emphasis on data as an Enterprise asset. In order to optimize intelligence and security processes and procedures, data must flow freely between systems and with unit supervisors and commanders. If confirmed, I will ensure a complete assessment of the governance structure and will facilitate close partnerships with other DoD stakeholders to optimize security IT systems for enhanced information sharing to inform personnel vetting and insider threat risk mitigation.

62. How should insider threat architecture and activities overseen by USD(I&S) be integrated and coordinated with the Department's cybersecurity architecture and activities, in your view? Can network activity monitoring for cybersecurity, especially on DOD's unclassified network, inform and augment insider threat detection? Can user activity monitoring for insider threat detection inform cybersecurity?

I understand OUSD(I&S) maintains a close partnership with the office of the DoD CIO, to foster integration and collaboration relevant to insider threat, user activity monitoring, and cybersecurity.

If confirmed, I will work to continue this partnership and seek ways to enhance our efforts to find areas of common interest, force multiplication, and implement efficiencies across both missions of insider threat detection and cybersecurity.

I will also work closely with leaders and staff across the Department to identify any policy constraints that impede our efforts to detect potential insider threats early on.

63. In your view, does the OUSD(I&S) have the requisite authority and technical expertise to guide the development of a comprehensive capability that uses modern information technology to integrate all sources of information for identifying insider threats?

It is my understanding that OUSD (I&S) maintains a close partnership with the office of the DoD CIO for the planning and execution of user activity monitoring in support of insider threat activities.

I am unaware of authority gaps at this time, but if confirmed, I will examine the matter early in my tenure and address it, if required.

64. What is your understanding of the technical and systems integration challenges involved in improving personnel security processes and insider threat detection and prevention within DOD?

I understand that the Department is using an approach to implement capabilities that will integrate the latest technologies available to improve personnel vetting processes and provide timelier awareness and detection of insider threats.

65. What is your understanding of the cultural and organizational resistance to improvements in the personnel security processes and insider threat detection and prevention in DOD?

While I have not been briefed on these challenges, I believe that DoD experiences the common challenges faced by many organizations developing large scale information technology systems that are responsible for the ingest, dissemination, and retention of large volumes of data with interfaces across numerous platforms and missions.

If confirmed, I will actively engage leaders throughout OUSD(I&S), the Department, and the Defense Security Enterprise to drive the policies, culture, and resources to implement the reform efforts and technical enhancements necessary to evolve our security posture.

66. In your view, how should DCSA posture the Department to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats before they harm national security?

I understand DCSA provides services to inform DoD Component insider threat programs. If confirmed, I look forward to working with DoD leadership to ensure all DoD component insider threat programs are appropriately scoped to meet mission requirements.

67. What can the OUSD(I&S) do to ensure that senior leaders in each DOD Component—not only the intelligence or counterintelligence communities—are fully invested in protecting their people, facilities, information from insider threats as a core mission objective?

If confirmed, I would continually engage with the Component Heads, Department-wide, to ensure that their insider threat programs are in compliance with policies, procedures, training and reporting requirements.

If confirmed, I will support the Secretary's standing direction to increase individual and collective accountability to safeguard DoD personnel, information and resources.

68. How should vetting policies and processes applicable to foreign military students enrolled in DOD training and educational programs help to mitigate risk to U.S. personnel, facilities, and equipment?

For DoD, the safety of our people, their families, and facilities is paramount. I understand that in accordance with recent National Defense Authorization Act direction, DoD has closely aligned vetting and security processes for international military students (IMS) and their accompanying family members with that of U.S. military personnel. If confirmed, I will work to continue implementing statutory requirements to advance vetting policies and processes within the Department to help mitigate risks to U.S. personnel, facilities, and equipment.

69. How would you characterize the threat posed by foreign nations to the integrity of the

National Security Innovation Base? Which threats do you assess as most concerning, and why?

In my current role, I am acutely aware that the threat posed by foreign nations to the integrity of the National Security Innovation Base is significant and growing.

Foreign threat actors increasingly seek to weaponize the organic collaboration of our academic institutions and the open nature of acquisition processes against us. They do so to erode U.S. technological superiority critical to maintaining a military advantage over adversaries, and to the economic well-being of U.S. industry.

If confirmed, I look forward to further strengthening DoD efforts to thwart our adversaries while continuing to support these vital and enabling aspects of innovation.

70. In your view, is the OUSD(I&S) appropriately resourced and organized to ensure the security of the National Security Innovation Base, critical technology, and related intellectual property that are critical to the DOD? What changes, if any, would you recommend?

I have not been fully briefed on the resourcing and organization of OUSD(I&S) and the DoD components but am fully committed to the imperative to ensure DoD's protective functions are fully resourced and empowered to safeguard our critical and emerging technologies.

If confirmed, I will ensure that responsibilities under my purview are properly resourced to enable and advance the outcomes and expectations our warfighters rely on from the National Security Innovation Base.

71. How would you propose to improve the support provided by the DCSA, the DOD counterintelligence organizations, and the national Intelligence Community to better protect the National Security Innovation Base, and enhance the Department's innovation strategy, especially with respect to technology companies that are non-traditional DOD contractors?

Throughout my career, and especially in my current role, I am fully aware of how vital focused counterintelligence and effective security programs are to ensuring and enabling mission accomplishment.

I understand that OUSD(I&S) is a co-sponsor of the National Counterintelligence Task Force (NCITF) and, if confirmed, I will ensure OUSD(I&S) continues investing in and supporting this important effort to better protect the National Security Innovation Base.

Collection & Special Programs

72. In light of the rapidly evolving nature of the national security environment, to include significant advances by adversarial nations in the development and fielding of capabilities that could challenge DOD tradecraft, technologies, methodologies, and processes, what do you see as the most pressing challenges to DOD's ability to conduct technical and human intelligence collection activities?

Adversary investment in advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and encrypted communications, as well as the dispersion of sophisticated capabilities across the globe have complicated the information environment and reduced our national security advantage. In addition, the volume of commercially available data on individuals and their activity and the proliferation of both networked, correlated, and automated systems as well as algorithms that can exploit the information could pose a challenge to DoD human intelligence collection activities.

If confirmed, I would ensure that appropriate resources and funding are allocated to DISE efforts to address the reality of global Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance (UTS) and broaden our recruitment aperture to attract the technical expertise to enable us to better respond to the threats posed by these strategic competitors.

Additionally, I would make it a priority to broaden my network across the intelligence and security communities to ensure the DoD is synchronizing efforts to address these emerging threats enabled by rapid advancement in artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies.

73. If confirmed, how do you intend to approach these challenges to ensure that the DOD intelligence enterprise is postured to operate in an increasingly contested security and intelligence environment?

We are undoubtedly living in an increasingly contested security and intelligence environment. Embracing the advent of new technology and investing in innovative solutions is paramount to the Department's ability to leverage all available opportunities for collection in the physical and digital world.

If confirmed, I will lead the continuous review of processes and policies to support warfighters and decision makers in this changing environment. This may require changes in how DoD personnel train and use tradecraft, technologies, and methodologies, as well as process adjustments for collection analysis. Aggressive efforts to ensure DoD is leveraging the best commercial technologies will remain essential, as will our ability to rapidly field technologies where required.

Intelligence Oversight

74. In your view, what is the role of the OUSD(I&S) in ensuring that sensitive activities across DOD are consistently conducted in accordance with standards of legality and propriety?

I understand the USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. USD(I&S) establishes policy and provides oversight and direction for the coordination, assessment, reporting, and conduct of Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities, the Defense Cover Program, special communications, technical collection support to intelligence activities, defense sensitive support, and the clandestine use of technology.

If confirmed, I would work closely with relevant defense and interagency stakeholders, including the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Officer, to ensure DoD sensitive activities are conducted consistent with existing U.S. law and DoD policy.

75. In your view, how should the OUSD(I&S) engage with the President's Intelligence Oversight Board and on what matters?

I understand that DoD Directive 5148.11 establishes the Principal Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Transparency (PDATSD(PCLT))/Senior Intelligence Oversight Official (DoD SIOO), serves as the DoD lead for all matters associated with the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), including notifications of Questionable Intelligence Activities and Significant or Highly Sensitive Matters.

If confirmed, I would continue to cultivate a positive, professional relationship between OUSD(I&S) office and the PDATSD(PCLT)/DoD SIOO in engaging the IOB, to ensure that OUSD(I&S), as required by policy, provides subject matter expertise to support the DoD SIOO's inspection, investigative, and reporting activities, including its notifications to the IOB.

Information Operations

Our adversaries continue to conduct operations intended to shape the information environment in ways that undermine our national security.

76. What are your views on the roles, responsibilities, and preparedness of the DISE to deter and defend against adversarial information operations?

I believe that for DoD to compete effectively in the information environment, the DISE must inform and shape the perceptions of specific audiences to gain or maintain a competitive advantage. Our efforts to deter and defend against adversary information operations should be prioritized with appropriate resources and must include more robust coordination and

collaboration across the Department, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy acting as the Secretary of Defense's Principal Information Operations Advisor, as well as the Executive Branch.

77. What are your views on the role that the OUSD(I&S) should play in the development and supervision of the implementation of Information Operations policy, strategy, and resource sponsorship?

I understand that the Department continues to review its strategy, policy, and resources for information operations. I believe the USD(I&S) should play a key role in these efforts as the designated Principal Staff Assistant for certain information-related capabilities. If confirmed, I will seek to work closely with the USD(P), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other DoD leaders to ensure our collective organizational approach on Information Operations is optimized to achieve our national security goals, while also meeting the most rigorous standards for oversight.

78. In your view, how can the Defense Intelligence Enterprise better support the requirements of the combatant commanders for intelligence to enable their information operations?

I believe that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise should look to continue to enhance its ability to support combatant commanders by fully understanding adversary goals in the information environment and aligning analysis with combatant commander requirements for understanding adversary perceptions. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about how to improve the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's support to information operations.

79. What role should DOD, and the DISE in particular, including the National Security Agency and the intelligence elements of United States Cyber Command, occupy in combating foreign influence operations, especially those conducted via social media?

I expect that our adversaries and foreign states will continue to use influence operations and malign influence measures in their attempts to sway the U.S. population's preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, increase discord in the United States, and undermine the American people's confidence in our democratic process to our adversaries' advantage. If confirmed, I will work to ensure DoD and the DISE are postured to support the whole-of-government effort, using all elements of national power, to expose and counter clandestinely disseminated malign influence and information campaigns, propaganda, and disinformation.

80. What role should DOD and the DISE in particular, play in anticipating or responding to cyber attacks on commercial entities, in your view?

I am aware that DoD is responsible for threat response to DoD cyber incidents affecting DoD assets and the DoD Information Network (DoDIN). DoD can also support civil authorities for cyber incidents outside the DoDIN when requested by, for example, the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), when such support is approved by the appropriate DoD official or directed by the President.

In my view, DoD's support to commercial entities through voluntary initiatives such as the Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Program are instrumental to protecting government information on non-federal systems. Additionally, it is my understanding that regulatory requirements in DoD contracts help ensure incidents are properly reported to the government.

If confirmed, I would ensure the DISE is robustly supporting commercial entities with access to DoD information in coordination with the DoD CIO and other partners, and when authorized, partnering with civil authorities to support their response to cyber incidents elsewhere.

81. What are your views as to whether the “dual hatting” of the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National Security Agency should be maintained or terminated?

It is my understanding that Secretary Austin and DNI Haines considered the findings of the December 2022 Joint Study on the Dual Hat and decided to retain the Dual Hat leadership arrangement.

If confirmed, I will work closely with all key DoD and IC stakeholders to ensure the Dual Hat leadership structure effectively responds to current and projected adversary threats, enhances synergy between intelligence disciplines, and broadens defensive and offensive cybersecurity capabilities.

Torture and Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

82. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3?

I am not aware of the specific standards included in the Army Field Manual, but if confirmed, I expect to be briefed on its details. I am deeply committed, however, to the humane and dignified treatment of all detainees in the custody of the United States military in accordance with law, policy, and our values.

83. Are there certain policies or processes set forth in FM 2-22.3 that in your view are in particular need of revision? Please explain your answer.

I am not aware of any provisions in the FM that need to be revised, but if confirmed I will make an assessment.

Section 2441 of title 18, U.S. Code, defines grave breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and inhuman treatment.

84. In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a way that provides U.S. detainees in the custody of other nations, as well as foreign detainees in U.S. custody appropriate protections from abusive treatment?

Yes. Section 2441 applies to war crimes, including grave breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, committed by or against a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or a U.S. national. I believe that we must always hold ourselves to the highest standards for the humane treatment of all people, and that we make it clear to our foreign partners that we expect them to do the same.

Imperative for Independent Intelligence Analysis

85. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that DOD intelligence analysts, including those seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are independent and free of pressure from influence from their chain of command to reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference?

Defense intelligence assessments must remain unbiased, objective, and free from political interference. If confirmed, I will work across the OUSD(I&S) staff and the DISE to ensure that all DoD intelligence analysts adhere to the analytic standards in Intelligence Community Directive 203, which mandates that all-source intelligence analysis must be objective, independent of political considerations, and timely.

The Defense Intelligence Workforce

The USD(I&S) exercises policy oversight of the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) to ensure that defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components are structured; manned; trained—including joint intelligence training, certification, education, and professional development; and equipped to execute their missions.

86. Is the DOD civilian intelligence workforce properly sized, in your view? Please explain your answer.

I have not yet had an opportunity to analyze the defense civilian intelligence workforce in its size and capability, but I believe people are any organization's most important resource. However, if confirmed, I will seek to ensure the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is appropriately resourced to provide timely and reasoned intelligence products to the warfighters and policy makers.

87. Does the DOD civilian intelligence workforce have the appropriate capabilities, and are those capabilities properly distributed, in your view?

I do not have sufficient information to provide a full perspective at this time. However, based on my NGA experience, it is my impression that the DISE is effectively providing quality and timely intelligence to the warfighter and policy maker. NGA has effectively reached out to diverse sources rich in talent to support the GEOINT mission, to great effect. If confirmed, I will analyze our workforce alignment to NDS priorities and offer recommendations as needed.

88. Are the number and quality of candidates referred and available for consideration and selection by intelligence, counterintelligence, and security community hiring officials adequate to sustain and enhance the capabilities of the civilian intelligence workforce?

My time at NGA, NRO, and CIA has shown how important it is to have the talented and skilled workforce necessary to accomplish the mission. At NGA, our selecting officials have been provided slates of well-qualified candidates who admirably perform the GEOINT mission. If confirmed, I will work to ensure hiring officials throughout the DISE are presented with highly qualified candidates with the diversity of experiences, expertise and backgrounds necessary to support the mission.

89. If confirmed, what factors and characteristics would be most important to you in selecting a candidate for appointment in the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES)? As a Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) official?

The DISES provides the executive leadership for the DISE. I believe the Senior Executive Service Core Qualifications – Leading Change, Leading People, Results Driven, Business Acumen, and Building Coalitions – provide a sound underlying basis for executive selections and have focused my attention on those qualifications during my leadership at NGA. I believe there should be a premium placed on proven ability to effectively collaborate across organizational boundaries.

DISL employees complement the executive leadership of DISES by providing the extraordinary substantive and technical expertise, in combination with demonstrated talent for personal leadership within critical career fields. The expertise of these leaders is essential not only to delivering the highest quality intelligence products but also to developing talent for the future.

90. If confirmed, how would you go about ensuring that DISES and DISL under your authority are held accountable for both organizational performance and the rigorous performance management of their subordinate employees?

If confirmed, I plan to continue using the DoD executive and senior level performance management systems that are currently in place within the DISE and with which I am

familiar from my time with NGA. I believe that through the exercise of rigorous performance management from the executive level downward, through the organization and oversight of those processes at the USD(I&S) level, we can ensure accountability throughout the Enterprise.

91. Are you satisfied with the subject matter and rigor of DISES and DISL professional development programs currently available across DOD? If not, what changes would you make to these programs, if confirmed?

In my time at NGA, I have seen the value of a wide range of leadership development programs to hone a broad set of leadership skills. If confirmed, I plan to leverage these programs and add to them as necessary to ensure a robust DISES and DISL professional development program across the Enterprise.

92. Are you satisfied that the process employed by the OUSD(I&S) to validate whether a vacant DISES/DISL position should be rehired, restructured, or eliminated is effective in responding to current and emergent mission needs of the DISE? If confirmed as the USD(I&S), what would be your role in this process?

I have not yet been fully briefed on the validation process for DISES and DISL positions. However, I understand that continuous evaluation of requirements is essential to ensuring leadership positions are appropriately resourced and structured. If confirmed, I will ensure the continued oversight of the processes that support an agile and adaptive DISE.

93. Does the USD(I&S) need additional hiring, development, recruitment, retention, or compensation authorities to enable further improvements in the capacity and capability of the DCIPS? Please explain your answer.

In general, I understand that the authorities under Title 10 provide the Department with flexibility to address capacity and capability requirements of the civilian workforce. However, I am also aware that challenges continue to exist in DoD's ability to address competitive requirements for certain key skill areas, such as those in the cyber and STEM fields.

I am aware that that the Department has more recently implemented a new STEM/cyber pay plan that should help the next USD(I&S) address issues in recruiting and retaining this critical skillset for the DISE.

If confirmed, I will evaluate the effectiveness of those programs and I will communicate any additional support needed to address DCIPS workforce challenges.

94. Are there new or emerging tools, processes, methodologies or tradecraft that the DISE should be considering for incorporation into future training, education and accreditation activities, especially those that might be transplanted from other non-intelligence disciplines?

I have not yet been briefed on what might be under consideration for incorporation into the DISE from other sources. However, from my position within NGA, I certainly am aware that advances in technology must be incorporated into our training, education, and certification activities.

If confirmed, I will assess current plans for the incorporation of new capabilities into DISE training, education, and accreditation, and direct such action as may be appropriate.

Whistleblower Protection

Section 1034 of title 10, U.S. Code, prohibits taking or threatening to take an unfavorable personnel action against a member of the armed forces in retaliation for making a protected communication. Section 2302 of title 5, U.S. Code, provides similar protections to Federal civilian employees. By definition, protected communications include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside of the chain of command, including the Congress.

95. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that military and civilian members of the DISE who report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross mismanagement—including in classified programs—to appropriate authorities within or outside the chain of command—are protected from reprisal and retaliation, including from the very highest levels of DOD and the broader Intelligence Community?

If confirmed, I will commit to ensuring protections are afforded to DISE employees who report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross mismanagement, in a manner consistent with law, regulation, and policy. Additionally, I will ensure that personnel who pursue retaliatory actions upon protected personnel are addressed appropriately, as established by law, regulation, and policy.

96. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring consistency in the application and interpretation of whistleblower protections across the DISE?

If confirmed, I commit to ensuring DoD policy implementing such protections is applied consistently and uniformly in accordance with law.

Space

The United States has stood up the U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) and assigned it responsibility for the operational planning of DOD space missions and activities. Additionally, the U.S. Space Force was established as a sixth military service assigned responsibilities for the space domain.

97. If confirmed, what would be your approach to further enhancing the interface and synchronization of space-based capabilities resident in the Intelligence Community with military space organizations?

Unity of effort and synchronization between DoD and IC space-based capabilities is instrumental if we are to meet the national security objectives within the 2022 NDS.

If confirmed, my approach would be to proactively work with USSPACECOM, USSF, ODNI, and other IC and DoD stakeholders to understand the areas that are well-synchronized, and areas that could be improved. Through more effective teaming, I would lead efforts to clarify roles, establish or modify existing processes, and develop joint concepts of operation to optimize the use of DoD and IC capabilities in ways that are mutually beneficial to the DoD and IC.

98. In your view, how can the tasking of requirements in the space warfighting domain across DOD be more effectively integrated with similar requirements from Intelligence Community customers?

My time at the NGA and NRO has afforded me insights into how to integrate DoD and IC requirements more effectively.

If confirmed, I would work with the DoD and IC stakeholders to ensure that existing processes are matured in ways that rapidly in-take and adjudicate Combatant Command requirements by leveraging DoD, IC, and commercial assets. Additionally, I will ensure that all data collected is discoverable by multiple communities to the greatest extent possible.

The Space Force has been assigned the mission of space-based ISR. To ensure the timely presentation of forces and effects to the combatant commander by the Space Force, Congress enacted into law section 1684 of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (P.L. 118-31) which stated that:

“The Secretary of the Air Force shall be responsible for presenting space-based ground and airborne moving target indication systems to the combatant commands to accomplish missions assigned to such commands under the Unified Command Plan that— (1) are primarily or fully funded by the Department of Defense; and (2) provide near real-time, direct support to satisfy the operational requirements of such commands.”

99. If confirmed, will you faithfully adhere to this provision of law?

Yes. If confirmed, I will adhere to this provision of law.

Sexual Harassment

In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by “someone at work” in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.

100. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the Office of the USD(I&S)?

This conduct has no place in DoD or any workplace. If confirmed, I commit to exercising oversight of the DISE to ensure that reports of sexual harassment or gender discrimination are dealt with swiftly and in accordance with law and policy.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

101. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

102. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

103. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

104. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs

apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

105. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

106. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.

107. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes.