

UNITED STATES SENATE  
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF  
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UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

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Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as the Commander, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) it is my distinct honor to testify before you again on behalf of our dedicated service members and their families in the European theater.

Since the end of World War II, the security and prosperity of the United States have been linked with security in Europe. Transatlantic trade amounts to \$6.9 trillion annually, the most we share with any nation or organization in the world. In Europe, our “Access, Basing and Overflight” agreements give us the ability to intercept threats before they approach the United States, to project U.S. combat power globally, and to deter Russian aggression against NATO.

The Alliance’s military forces are in the process of an historic transformation to be fit for deterrence now and in the future. USEUCOM has a direct role in accelerating NATO’s modernization, readiness, and warfighting capabilities, which will drive the Alliance to assume greater responsibility and leadership for European security.

### **The Euro-Atlantic Security Environment**

The United States today confronts the most challenging threats in the European theater since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine just entered its fourth year, and Russia remains willing to use military force to accomplish its geopolitical objectives. These include ambitions to expand its territorial control; broaden its influence regionally and globally; and diminish U.S. leadership and influence. Russia is actively conducting a destabilization campaign within Europe intended to create strategic dilemmas for the United States. Furthermore, Russia’s ongoing effort to develop a massive military larger than its pre-war force, combined with its propensity to absorb military, political, and economic costs to achieve its strategic goals, indicate that Russia poses an enduring threat to the United States, our NATO Allies, and global security. This threat is intensified by Russia’s strengthened relationships with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and

the Republic of Iran (Iran). Together, this group of adversaries seeks to undermine U.S. and Allied advantages and challenge our vital interests at home and abroad.

Russia continues to pursue strategic objectives that undermine the United States. While the war in Ukraine has been Russia's focus and the most visible sign of Moscow's great power ambitions, Russia's strategic objectives are centered on attaining unencumbered influence in its near-abroad and greater international power while diminishing the leadership and influence of the United States. The Kremlin openly communicates its desire for an alternative to NATO as the European security architecture, to expand Russia's military, and to increase force presence in key locations along NATO borders. Following the old Soviet playbook, Russia is engaging in a calculated destabilization campaign through cyberattacks on infrastructure, public sabotage, targeted violence, weaponized migration, election interference, and information operations. These activities have serious consequences for the freedoms and prosperity we enjoy in the United States. Taken together, they confirm the chronic threat that Russia poses to U.S. interests.

Within this broader context, the war in Ukraine is fundamentally about creating opportunities for Russia to gain geopolitical advantages and denying them to NATO. The scale of violence on the battlefields in Kursk, Donetsk, and Bakhmut demonstrates Russia's willingness to employ brutal means in pursuit of its goals. Now entangled in an extended, large-scale war, the Russian regime has refashioned its military, economic, and social structures to sustain what it describes as a long-term confrontation with the West—systemic changes that illustrate Russia's intention to confront us into the foreseeable future.

### **Russian Reconstitution**

Despite extensive battlefield losses in Ukraine, the Russian military is reconstituting and growing at a faster rate than most analysts had anticipated. In fact, the Russian army, which has borne the brunt of combat, is today larger than it was at the beginning of the war—despite suffering an estimated 790,000 casualties. In December 2024, Moscow ordered the military to

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increase its strength to 1.5 million active service members and is recruiting approximately 30,000 troops per month. Russian forces on the frontlines of Ukraine are now at over 600,000, the highest level over the course of the war and almost double the size of the initial invasion force.

Russia is not just reconstituting service members but is also replacing combat vehicles and munitions at an unprecedented pace. Russian ground forces in Ukraine have lost an estimated 3,000 tanks, 9,000 armored vehicles, 13,000 artillery systems, and over 400 air defense systems in the past year—but is on pace to replace them all. Russia has expanded its industrial production, opened new manufacturing facilities, and converted commercial production lines for military purposes. As a result, the Russian defense industrial base is expected to roll out 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 200 Iskander ballistic and cruise missiles this year. (Comparatively, the United States only produces about 135 tanks per year and no longer produces new Bradley Fighting Vehicles.) Additionally, we anticipate Russia to produce 250,000 artillery shells per month, which puts it on track to build a stockpile three times greater than the United States and Europe combined.

Not all of Russia's military capability has been degraded by the war. Russia continues to hold the largest nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. Russia's nuclear arsenal is composed of an estimated 2,500-3,500 high- and low-yield warheads, which can be tailored for use on the battlefield or employed strategically. Recently, the Kremlin updated its nuclear policy, which is intended to communicate a lower nuclear threshold and outlines the range of contingencies that could justify the use of nuclear weapons. Russia also maintains robust chemical and biological weapons programs and has repeatedly used the chemical weapon chloropicrin and riot control agents as a method of warfare across the frontlines of Ukraine, in violation of its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Within its air and maritime capabilities, Russia has sustained only minor losses in Ukraine. The Russian Aerospace Force currently retains over 1,100 combat-capable aircraft that include Su-57 stealth fighters and Tu-95 and Tu-160

strategic bombers. Aside from some losses in its Black Sea Fleet, the Russian Navy remains intact, with over 60 submarines and 42 surface vessels capable of launching nuclear-tipped Kalibr cruise missiles.

Russian commanders still emphasize quantity and mass over skill and operational acumen. However, the poorly resourced and disorganized Russian forces we saw during the initial invasion have improved significantly. Russian formations are gaining combat experience. The military has demonstrated its ability to learn from the battlefield, disseminate new concepts across organizations, and counter Ukrainian tactical and technical advantages. It has implemented rapid cycles of adaptation and is developing new capabilities to accelerate force modernization. In November 2024, the Russian military conducted its first strike on a Ukrainian military facility with the new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile. Russian officials have stated this missile could be equipped with a nuclear warhead. We have seen Russian forces employ new, domestically produced electronic countermeasures against Ukrainian jamming technology to improve strike efficacy. Additionally, Russian ground forces are integrating reconnaissance and one-way attack drones into their offensives on the battlefield. Russia is also expanding its undersea capabilities through the addition of Severodvinsk-II class nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarines, Dolgorukiy II-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and other undersea reconnaissance capabilities both in the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. These new capabilities show that the Russian military is intent on gaining tactical and operational advantage for the future battlefield.

To support Russia's growing military apparatus, the Kremlin has established economic policies to restructure its financial institutions and defense industry. In September 2024, Russia announced a 25% increase in defense spending, which represents 6.3% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This marks the fourth consecutive year that Russia increased its defense spending to fund the war in Ukraine and resource plans that expand its active military. All told, Russia's defense budget will account for 40% of all government expenditures which is at its

highest level since the Cold War. As a direct result of its defense spending, Russian investments in its industrial base have reduced national unemployment to 2.4%. The Russian economy is on a war footing and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

### **Russia's Strategic Partnerships**

Further complicating the global security environment and threatening the United States are Russia's deepening strategic partnerships with our adversaries. Russia's increasing collusion with the CCP, the DPRK, and Iran serves as a force multiplier for Moscow's geopolitical goals. The group shares Russia's vision of a multipolar world and is providing an economic lifeline to Moscow. To avoid Western sanctions, the CCP and Russia are increasing the use of national currencies to conduct trade outside of SWIFT, using non-traditional finance options for business transactions, and employing financial techniques to bypass secondary sanctions. Half of Russia's energy exports currently go to China, and Russia's use of a "shadow fleet" allows it to circumvent the U.S. and G7+ partners' oil price cap policy.

Just as concerning as stronger economic ties is the increasing military collaboration between these nations. Russia's introduction of 12,000 North Korean troops into the Kursk oblast this past fall constituted an egregious escalation of the conflict. It also has global ramifications, creating the opportunity for North Korean soldiers to gain experience from modern combat and take their lessons back to the Indo-Pacific. The DPRK is providing millions of artillery shells, missiles, and weapon systems to fuel Russian operations in Ukraine, with more than 13,000 containers of supplies delivered to Russia in the past year. In exchange, Russia is almost certainly transferring missile technology to Pyongyang. The two countries further solidified their relationship by signing a mutual defense treaty in June 2024, reaffirming their wide-ranging cooperation. Iran also continued its material support for Russia, donating over 400 short-range ballistic missiles and hundreds of thousands of artillery shells. Beyond the munitions, Iran expanded its own industrial capacity to sell thousands of Shahed one-way attack drones. Tehran also provided Moscow with the licenses and technology to manufacture

thousands more Shaheds in Russia. And, similar to the DPRK, Tehran also signed the Iranian Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Moscow in January 2025.

Russia's "no limits" partnership with the CCP is creating military opportunities for our adversaries to directly hold U.S. interests at risk. In the past year, Russia and the CCP conducted two combined bomber patrols—from Russia—one over the Bering Sea and another over the Sea of Japan. These patrols marked the first time Chinese bombers departed from the same airbase with Russian bombers, the first time Chinese bombers entered the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone, and the first time Chinese nuclear-capable H-6N bombers took part in a combined patrol. In the maritime domain, the CCP and Russia conducted their fourth annual combined naval exercise, while their coast guards conducted their first combined patrol in the northern Pacific. As the Arctic ice cap recedes, both the CCP and Russia are looking to exploit the new navigable waterways. Meanwhile in the land domain, Russia and the CCP continue to expand the scope of their regularly conducted, combined-military exercises and increase their training on more sophisticated weapons platforms.

The CCP also seeks to create opportunities in Europe to exert its global influence and fracture the West. For instance, the CCP's strategic investments with individual European countries cause potential strain within the NATO Alliance. CCP state-owned enterprises continue to make substantial investments into European commercial ports, handling over 10% of Europe's port capacity. Fourteen European ports near, or co-located with, logistics hubs that move equipment and forces have significant CCP investment, which creates risks for the United States and NATO Alliance. While many European countries recognize the national security risks associated with CCP state-owned enterprises, Beijing is pushing to expand telecommunication services, green-energy companies, and electric vehicle industries within Europe. These investments may create economic growth, but they also pose security risks and offer openings for China and Russia to degrade U.S. interests and sow disunity among Allies.

The deepening economic and military partnerships between Russia, the CCP, the DPRK, and Iran are indicative of a more intricate and global threat. These close partnerships underscore that the United States is increasingly likely to face multiple threats simultaneously. Moreover, our adversaries are learning from the war in Ukraine and accelerating the exchange of military technologies. These dynamics will shape the future threat environment, not only in Europe, but also in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East.

### **Threats on the Periphery**

Russia is exploiting the volatility in high-risk regions of Europe to expand its influence at the expense of the United States. In Georgia, the pro-Russian Georgia Dream party has aligned Tbilisi closer to Moscow. In Moldova, Russian influence in the November 2024 presidential election intensified as Moscow engaged in fraudulent vote-buying, election related cyberattacks, and false bomb threats against polling stations, as well as employing trained agitators to incite disorder. Since the spring of 2024, Russia has been working to steer the Western Balkans away from Euro-Atlantic integration through key-leader rhetoric, information operations, diplomatic outreach, and economic influence. Russia also courted Serbian and Bosnian-Serb officials who moved closer into the Kremlin's orbit following their participation at the October 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia.

Russia's intention is clear—it seeks to destabilize European security, increase its regional and global power, and decrease U.S. global strength. Russia is willing to sustain the high costs of a prolonged war in Ukraine; engage in a destabilization campaign against the West; build threatening relationships with the CCP, the DPRK, and Iran; and cause instability in other regions of the world.

### **USEUCOM's Strategic Imperatives**

USEUCOM contributes to U.S. strength, safety, and prosperity through three strategic imperatives: Defend the homeland forward; Project U.S. combat power globally; and Deter Russian aggression.



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By virtue of USEUCOM's strategic location in Europe, our fundamental mission is to defend the homeland forward. As an example, USEUCOM operates in the northern Atlantic Ocean to prevent Russian nuclear-capable undersea forces from maneuvering within cruise-missile range of the United States. Preventing a Russian breakout across the Atlantic requires USEUCOM, along with our Allies, to posture, integrate, and employ a suite of capabilities to deter and block Moscow from threatening the homeland.

Defending the homeland also requires deep intelligence structures and relationships that provide us with invaluable and sensitive information critical to U.S. national security. Our ability to gather this intelligence is enabled through enduring relationships with our European Allies. These relationships cannot develop episodically; they must be sustained by enduring U.S. engagement.

Projecting U.S. power is a fundamental task for USEUCOM. U.S. power projection platforms in Europe require "Access, Basing, and Overflight" agreements from the countries we seek to operate in and from. These legally binding and politically agreed arrangements enable the United States to project U.S. combat power not just within Europe, but globally. For example, the arrangements we have in Europe proved crucial in 2024 for the United States' support of the defense of Israel. USEUCOM directly supported U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM) efforts in the Israel-Hamas conflict by providing Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capable ships to the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as sharing sensor data that enables USCENTCOM BMD protection capabilities. These cross-Combatant Command operations demonstrate the efficiencies that USEUCOM's force projection capabilities provide against DoD's many global priorities. The politically binding nature of the agreements that enable USEUCOM's power projection capability require the host nations in Europe to know that we will honor and respect their interests and that we will not violate their hospitality. This requires trust and confidence between both the United States and individual European nations. In exchange, we enjoy unparalleled responsiveness in crises.

Finally, USEUCOM deters Russian aggression against NATO. Credible deterrence requires the presence of combat-capable forces and a sufficient force presence to convince Russia that any military action harmful to the interests of the United States will be met with force. Therefore, USEUCOM must prepare the forces assigned and allocated to us to fight and win; and develop key infrastructure throughout the theater to support readiness and operations.

### **USEUCOM Postured Across Europe**

Our brave service members professionally represent the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Space Force, Coast Guard, and Special Operations Forces, all of whom remain steadfast in our mission to deter an expanding Russian threat. Their dedicated efforts secure the United States forward, advance American national interests, and advance the shared interests we maintain with our Allies.

USEUCOM currently commands nearly 80,000 American service members throughout the European theater. This is a reduction from the 105,000 service members postured in Europe after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and represents about 20% of the U.S. forces that were stationed in Europe during the Cold War to deter the Soviet Union.

Deterrence is most challenging in the land domain. Russia continues to reconstitute its conventional forces, and possesses advantages in geography, domain, and readiness. A conventional fight with Russia will be decided on land, and it would likely begin with a comparatively large Russian force positioned on a NATO border in order to negate traditional U.S. and NATO advantages in, and preferences for, long-range, standoff warfare. Therefore, NATO, including USEUCOM, must be postured to blunt Russia's ability to rapidly mass numerically superior land forces.

In the air domain, USEUCOM and Allies require a combination of standoff and survivable, distributed capabilities to identify, target, and engage attacking forces at the outset of conflict in a heavily contested environment. USEUCOM established one F-35 squadron at Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath in the United Kingdom, which is now fully operational. A

second squadron of F-35s will be complete this summer and will achieve full operational capability this fall. These two squadrons will replace fourth-generation aircraft currently stationed in Europe with more advanced fifth-generation capabilities. To enable aerospace lethality, USEUCOM continues to work with our Allies and partners to implement the U.S. Air Force's Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept. Once fully realized, ACE is envisioned to support American and Allied aircraft with shared infrastructure in multiple locations throughout Europe, enabling our air forces to become more dynamic and survivable against our adversaries' air and anti-air defense capabilities. This includes integrating U.S. and NATO command-and-control structures that provide early warning and detection against Russian conventional and nuclear-capable forces. Should Russia mobilize its conventional forces, the NATO Alliance will be able to activate its defense plans and respond with force. If NATO's alert system detects Russian nuclear activity, USEUCOM provides an essential component of the U.S. nuclear umbrella that helps to guarantee our Allies' security.

In the maritime domain, surface, sub-surface, and land-based capabilities protect the homeland forward, ensure transatlantic-power projection, defend key maritime terrain and lines of communication, and represent a critical leg of our nuclear triad. The USS Oscar Austin, the fifth Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer committed to the European theater, arrived in Rota, Spain this past October. The USS Oscar Austin expands our anti-air and anti-submarine warfare capabilities across the European theater. USEUCOM awaits the arrival of its sixth Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer soon, as well as receiving a new Auxiliary General Ocean class surveillance ship to expand our underwater surveillance and detection capabilities. These maritime capabilities complement the U.S. Marine Corps' presence in the High North, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Mediterranean to enable sea control from the shore. USEUCOM also conducts air and maritime patrols in the High North alongside our Nordic Allies and the United Kingdom. These operations demonstrate freedom of navigation in Arctic waters and support international maritime law.

In the cyber domain, USEUCOM receives direct support from U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) through the Joint Force Headquarters – Cyber. It is responsible for the planning, oversight, and management of cyber operations within the theater. Additionally, each service component has a robust cyber capability to protect its networks from external threats. Finally, USEUCOM collaborates with USCYBERCOM to enhance both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, leveraging coordination with our Allies and partners. This initiative aims to deter advanced, persistent threats and bolster the resilience of the NATO Alliance.

In the space domain, our newest service component, U.S. Space Forces Europe and Africa, continues to build its capabilities since activation in December 2023. Capitalizing on our space capability advantages requires forward-positioned equipment and Guardians to operate it. These capabilities, particularly assets that are strategically tethered in Europe and supported by our Allies, provide us the ability to deliver space effects globally against all our adversaries. Our space component has rapidly built relationships with NATO Allies to increase Allied contributions to our collective security from space-based threats. It remains integral to creating a networked, joint-space architecture responsible for protecting space assets and to deliver space-related benefits across the entire globe.

USEUCOM's Special Operations Forces (SOF) maintain a persistent presence across 28 European countries. These forces focus on tasks to bolster deterrence and set conditions to prevail in conflict, recently expanding our relationships with Nordic nations. Moreover, Special Operations Command Europe and NATO Allied Special Operations Forces Command recently merged under U.S. command, which improves European SOF capability under the leadership of a single U.S. commanding general.

### **USEUCOM's Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI)**

USEUCOM's OAIs send a clear and credible deterrent message to Russia and other U.S. adversaries that the United States is ready, willing, and able to defend U.S. interests in the Euro-Atlantic area. Our OAIs don't just deter adversaries and promote stability, they also

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reassure our Allies and partners of the U.S. commitment to security. This commitment is global: USEUCOM also conducts OAs in support of other U.S. Combatant Commands in order to deter interconnected threats from Russia, the CCP, the DPRK, and Iran.

USEUCOM's OAs are vital to our ability to build well-trained, interoperable, and combat-ready forces. We do this alongside our NATO Allies through an extensive joint and multinational exercise program. Continuing these exercises to build interoperable, combat-ready, and lethal forces is critical to expanding NATO's warfighting capabilities. To improve preparedness for conflict, USEUCOM and NATO are developing realistic training scenarios for these events that simulate the plausible pathways to conflict that provide a credible threat for our forces to train against. All told, these training exercises represent a mind-set shift toward collective defense and warfighting for high-intensity conflict alongside our NATO Allies.

U.S. investments through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) support USEUCOM's ability to build readiness and deter aggression. EDI funding supports the rotational deployment of U.S. forces to Europe, generates readiness through exercises and training, expands the pre-positioning of combat-credible forces, improves military infrastructure, and builds interoperability with our NATO Allies and European partners.

In executing EDI-funded projects, we seek to share costs with our Allies. For example, Poland leveraged NATO Security Investment Program funds to build a \$325 million storage facility for a U.S. armored BCT equipment set at the Army Prepositioned Stocks site in Powidz. The Polish Army will also maintain the equipment in accordance with the U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

In addition to deterring Russian aggression against NATO on behalf of the DoD, USEUCOM coordinates and executes U.S. security assistance to Ukraine. Since 2022, USEUCOM's Security Assistance Group – Ukraine (SAG-U) has delivered to Ukraine \$65.9 billion in munitions, weapons, vehicles, and other assistance. SAG-U's mission is to support security-assistance activities, coordinate training, oversee efforts to supply and equip the Armed

Forces of Ukraine (AFU), and enhance Ukraine's situational awareness. This security assistance has enabled Ukraine to defend itself from Russian attack, providing opportunities for the Joint Force to learn and adapt from observed battlefield successes and challenges.

In December, NATO stood up the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), which has assumed the mission to create enduring, predictable, and coherent support to Ukraine through the coordination of Allied logistics, training, and planning efforts. This also means NATO is responsible for defending logistical nodes on NATO's eastern flank that the Allies use to support and train the AFU. The creation of NSATU is a huge step for NATO to assume a greater role in supporting Ukraine's self-defense.

Our NATO Allies have also made substantial contributions to Ukraine's defense, allocating more than \$60 billion in military assistance to support Ukraine's war effort. In some cases, NATO Allies donated their entire inventory of certain weapon systems. To backfill these systems, our Allies purchased upgraded replacements from U.S. companies. From FY 17-21, the FMS portfolio for our European Allies averaged \$11 billion annually; but in FY 24 it was \$68 billion—a 600% increase. However, insufficient production capacity across the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) is delaying the replacement of these systems and creating strategic risks for not only our NATO Allies, but also U.S. forces. Despite foreign governments investing more into the U.S. DIB, many critical systems—such as HIMARs, F-35s, Patriots, and infantry fighting vehicles—are not delivering on time. The problem of slow production is compounded by frustration with an overly expensive, slow, and increasingly mistake-prone Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, and Allies are increasingly likely to look elsewhere for armaments. USEUCOM engages with our Allies on this issue daily and is working with the DoD on FMS and broader armaments cooperation to encourage the U.S. defense industry to produce sustainable capabilities and deliver them quickly.

## Strengthening NATO

Our NATO Allies have embarked upon an historic effort to modernize the Alliance's systems and readiness for collective defense, and they are demonstrating resolve in reorienting towards that traditional mission. Considerable progress has been made over the past year.

The three Regional Plans approved at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius continue to serve as the blueprint for the modernization efforts. First, these plans define a force structure requirement that outlines the exact military capabilities that NATO will need to execute the plans—and assign specific capability targets for each Ally. Nations now have an objective, plans-based “shopping list” for their defense spending and are using this framework to drive their national procurement processes. To meet these requirements, nations are investing at an unprecedented rate.

Second, the Alliance has restructured its command-and-control systems to better synchronize multi-domain operations for high-intensity conflict. Headquarters are linked to specific terrain which enhances interoperability with assigned units and generates readiness for large-scale territorial defense.

Third, Allies have delegated operational decision-making and many basic military authorities to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe that had previously been withheld at the political level. This now grants Allied military structures the ability to act and react at the speed of relevance in the current security environment. There are already instances of these new authorities rapidly enabling activities, such as the ongoing efforts in the Baltic Sea to protect critical undersea infrastructure and employment of the Allied Reaction Force in the Western Balkans.

USEUCOM is accelerating NATO's modernization for collective defense and ownership of European security through the ruthless prioritization of warfighting capabilities and readiness within the Alliance. The United States leads the combined militaries of 32 Allied nations across the Euro-Atlantic. USEUCOM's warfighting-focused and plans-based approach builds the

Alliance capability required for collective defense while enabling the U.S. Joint Force greater strategic flexibility to address other global priorities.

**Conclusion**

USEUCOM maintains the capability and capacity to defend the homeland forward, project U.S. combat power globally, and deter Russian aggression against NATO in support of U.S. interests. Moscow's ongoing war in Ukraine, destabilization campaign against the West, societal mobilization for war, and growing strategic partnerships with our adversaries all indicate that Russia will continue to threaten U.S. security and economic interests well into the future. Therefore, the United States and NATO need to continue to prepare to meet this threat. USEUCOM is helping to prepare the Alliance by increasing European ownership of European security; prioritizing warfighting in everything we do; and building readiness to execute the defense plans. All of this requires U.S. leadership, continued investment in advanced capabilities, and a sustainable transition to an Allied-led defense in Europe. The global threats we face today are significant, perhaps never more so than since the end of the Cold War. Through USEUCOM, with the strength and professionalism of our forces and NATO's commitment to collective defense, our investments in Europe today will secure the peace for our future.