

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Randall Reed, USAF,
Nominee to be Commander, U.S. Transportation Command

Duties and Qualifications

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command?

The Commander, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), is responsible for providing air, land, and sea transportation for the DoD, in peace, crisis and war. USTRANSCOM executes this mission through three component commands, Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), and a subordinate command, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). The Commander is assigned six responsibilities in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), to include: Mobility Joint Force Provider, DOD single manager for transportation, Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise planning and operations, DOD Single Manager for Patient Movement, the Joint Enabling Capabilities provider, and single manager for Global Bulk Fuel and Delivery.

What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform these duties?

Beyond my experience commanding mobility units at multiple levels and repeat staff assignments at Air Mobility Command, I was the Commander of Third Air Force which has oversight of Air Mobility Forces across Europe and Africa. I also served as the Chief of Staff for the Joint Staff's Director of Logistics. During this time on the Joint Staff, I acquired in-depth knowledge of and experience with the National Defense Strategy, as well as the roles of the Military Services, Combatant Commanders, the Chairman, and the Secretary of Defense to create and execute globally integrated plans and comprehensive policies that achieve National interests. Prior to my time as the Commander of Third Air Force, I was given the opportunity to serve as the Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché to Türkiye. In this role I served as the principal advisor for all defense and national security matters with significant coordinating authority. Additionally, this assignment provided a unique opportunity to work with a strategic ally that has a key role in great power competition with influence in Europe and the Middle East. I gained a great appreciation for the importance of bilateral relationships with key allies. In Türkiye's case, basing and overflight, support to U.S. Naval forces in the Mediterranean, and maritime access of the Bosphorus Strait for our commercial shipping interests were routine topics that directly relate to USTRANSCOM's role as the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise manager.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command?

As the AMC Deputy Commander, I appreciate the breadth of USTRANSCOM's worldwide responsibilities. If confirmed, I will engage with the USTRANSCOM's component commands,

DoD and other Department agencies, and commercial partners to ensure I fully understand the range of challenges they face to accomplish USTRANSCOM's crucial mission.

Relationships

If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

The Secretary of Defense

The USTRANSCOM Commander performs the duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and is responsible directly to the Secretary of Defense to carry out the command's missions.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has the authority to act for the Secretary of Defense when serving as his designated representative in the Secretary's absence. As such, the USTRANSCOM Commander will report to and through the Deputy Secretary when serving in that capacity.

The Under Secretaries of Defense

Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DoD components, including Combatant Commands, which have collateral or related functions. In practice, this coordination and exchange is normally routed through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment provides logistics policy for the Department. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing these relationships.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As specified in Title 10 of the United States Code, the Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman is not, by law, in the chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to each Combatant Commander. In his or her role as the Global Integrator, however, the Chairman plays an important role in a full range of security matters on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will keep the Chairman fully informed regarding the USTRANSCOM mission.

The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs

Each Service Secretary is responsible for equipping, training, and maintaining ready forces belonging to that Military Department. Close coordination with each Service Secretary providing forces to USTRANSCOM is essential to ensure the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) remains ready to meet national security requirements. In addition, USTRANSCOM is responsible to deliver Service-provided forces to Combatant Commanders. If confirmed, I will continue my predecessors' productive dialogue with the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.

The other combatant commanders

As one of four Unified Command Plan-designated Combatant Commands with transregional responsibilities, USTRANSCOM's primary mission is to support each of the Combatant Commanders to accomplish the responsibilities assigned to them in the UCP. Given the complexity of today's security environment, it is essential for all the Combatant Commanders to work together to execute U.S. national security policy. If confirmed, I will continue to build upon the trust and mutual support my predecessors have fostered with the other Combatant Commanders.

The Director of the Defense Logistics Agency

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) manages the global supply chain for the DoD, other Federal agencies, and partner and allied nations. USTRANSCOM maintains a strong strategic partnership with DLA and includes the DLA Director in the USTRANSCOM periodic Component Commanders conferences. If confirmed, I will continue to partner with and strengthen this relationship with DLA. DLA and USTRANSCOM have ongoing transformational activities to improve JDDE operational outcomes and lay the groundwork for data-related initiatives.

Major Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, U.S. Transportation Command?

The major challenge confronting USTRANSCOM is presenting sufficient and credible mobility capacity that is responsive, agile, and ready to support global demands. USTRANSCOM sets the globe daily - working alongside allies and partners to deploy and sustain the warfighter across increasingly complex operational environments. Significant challenges include working across DoD to address the capacity and readiness gaps of our mobility forces, improve force capabilities such as connectivity, battlespace awareness, command and control, and improve global posture.

If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will work with my fellow Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, Defense Agencies, Joint Staff, OSD, and other Executive Departments to preserve our ability to project and sustain power in daily competition while ensuring that we have the capacity and capability to surge to meet the demands of a potential future fight. Focus areas include preparing now for the next generation of airlift and air refueling platforms, investing in new ship construction and purchasing used ships to maintain sufficient sealift capacity, overcoming patient movement gaps through deliberate investment and exercising, maturing the progress made in the global bulk fuel mission through fuel afloat employment and fuel infrastructure development, and advancing in new technology to make our mobility fleets more connected and survivable.

During my time at Air Mobility Command, we took strides in exercising air mobility missions in a simulated contested environment; I look forward to working with the service components to drive similar contested logistics exercises across the joint enterprise. I am confident that with the support of our component commands, interagency and commercial partners, and the broader Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise, we can meet these challenges and continue to ensure the readiness, modernization, and resilience of our global transportation network.

Funding Shortfalls

In your view, is U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) properly resourced to meet the combatant command's requirements?

I believe USTRANSCOM is properly resourced to meet combatant command requirements in daily competition through the Transportation Working Capital Fund. USTRANSCOM is reliant on the Services to remedy growing gaps across their portfolios to ensure a capable deployment and distribution enterprise to support the National Defense Strategy.

In your view, do the military departments properly resource their budgets for TRANSCOM to meet its requirements?

It is my understanding that under the current budget process the Services balance risk within their respective portfolio, making difficult choices in a fiscally constrained environment.

For the last three fiscal years, TRANSCOM has not submitted a report detailing their unfunded priorities as required by 10 USC 222a despite citing numerous shortfalls during the posture cycles.

If confirmed, do you plan on submitting a report to Congress on TRANSCOM's unfunded priorities if the military departments do not adequately resource TRANSCOM to meet its requirements?

USTRANSCOM's strong working relationship with Congress, the Military Services, and other Combatant Commands during the Program Review process aids in resolving critical disconnects between Service POMs and USTRANSCOM's strategic priorities. If the Services do not adequately resource USTRANSCOM requirements, I will assess whether an unfunded priority list is necessary.

2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS)

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China as the "most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department" and stated that Russia poses an "acute threat," as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The NDS also identifies "[m]utually-beneficial Alliances and partnerships" as "an enduring strength for the United States."

In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment, including prioritization among the most critical challenges and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies? Please explain your answer.

Yes. The 2022 NDS makes clear that we face real and pervasive threats now; the pacing challenge and the paradigm of strategic competition guides Combatant Command actions through Integrated Deterrence, Campaigning, and Building Enduring Advantages as its strategic approach. We must remain keenly focused on sustained deterrence required for the pacing challenge presented by the People's Republic of China while addressing the acute threat from Russia and persistent threats posed by North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations.

If confirmed, I will follow the tenets of the NDS and will emphasize the challenges and importance of deployment and distribution requirements to our national defense.

In your view, does the 2022 NDS correctly specify the priority missions of the DOD and the capabilities by which DOD can achieve its objectives in the context of the current strategic environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?

Yes, I believe the 2022 NDS correctly specifies the DoD's priority mission. Defending the homeland and deterring strategic attack is undergirded by a ready force that is bolstered by our partners and allies. Preserving the asymmetric military advantage necessary for deterrence mandates continuous investment in new technologies and the associated processes to outpace our adversaries in the constantly evolving strategic landscape. Achieving integrated deterrence mandates a focus on interoperability amongst our partners and allies – eliminating the gaps in our formations through collaborative exercises and collective campaigning to enable enduring advantage.

The area of greatest risk in these pursuits is failing to invest in our force and failing to invest in our friendships. We require stable and predictable resourcing and flexible acquisition processes to speed capability delivery to equip the Joint Force. USTRANSCOM relies on our Allies and partners every day as our global logistics nodes depend on access to foreign airspace, sea lanes, and basing. Continuing to nourish these partnerships and our collective capabilities will be a priority if confirmed.

In your view, are the components of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) adequately sized, structured, and resourced to implement the 2022 NDS and the associated operational plans? Please explain your answer.

From a component organization perspective, they appear to be sized and organized effectively for the USTRANSCOM mission, and if confirmed I look forward to working closely with the Components and the Military Services to ensure this is, and remains, the case. From a capability resourcing perspective, USTRANSCOM regularly analyzes the capability and associated risk in meeting warfighting demands as outlined in the National Defense Strategy. These studies emphasize the need for sufficiently capable and ready strategic airlift platforms (C-17 and C-5), continuous modernization and recapitalization of our air refueling aircraft (KC-135, KC-46, Next

Generation Air Refueling System), and sustained recapitalization of our sealift fleet to ensure USTRANSCOM sustains the credible capacity necessary to project and sustain the Joint Force.

The organic sealift fleet is currently sufficient to meet wartime needs at an acceptable level of risk, but an aging fleet makes recapitalization an urgent priority. The strategic airlift fleet has sufficient capacity, but at elevated risk, and will be stressed to meet wartime requirements. The air refueling fleet remains increasingly challenged in terms of increasing joint force demands with adversary actions complicating air refueling employment. Finally, analysis highlights a tight coupling between intra-theater airlift and sea-lift assets. Absent sufficient shallow-draft sealift vessels, mobility requirements shift to intra-theater airlift, exacerbating significant demands already levied on the airlift fleet.

The NDS's Global Operating Model and Dynamic Force Employment concepts emphasize sustaining capabilities for major combat, while "providing options for proactive and scalable employment of the Joint Force."

If confirmed, how do you intend to work with the services to implement these concepts while balancing the need to rebuild readiness?

Accomplishing the USTRANSCOM global mission relies on the framework of global mobility posture; global mobility capacity; and command, control, and integration. The most pressing needs to meet this framework are found in Service-provided capabilities, primarily focused on the age, number of aircraft and sealift vessels required, and the capability to operate in this new strategic environment. Modernizing these elements of the mobility enterprise requires close coordination with all the Services, Combatant Commands, the DoD and the interagency through normal DoD strategic planning and resource processes and personal engagements.

USTRANSCOM must also work with the Services to build and sustain readiness across the active, reserve, and national guard components as *all* components are critical to the performance of our missions. If confirmed, I will ensure USTRANSCOM continues to address mobility requirements to accomplish their global mission.

As part of its focus on near peer competitors, the NDS disputes the decades-long assumption that the U.S. military will have uncontested access to international airspace and sea lanes.

Given this new threat, what areas of operations will be more challenging for the joint distribution and deployment enterprise, and what would you do, if confirmed, to mitigate those challenges?

Our adversaries will leverage their capabilities across all domains to negatively influence and disrupt our ability to project the force, provide sustainment and effectively execute our Unified Command Plan roles and responsibilities. We've seen these threats and hazards play out in a variety of ways, from physical challenges to freedom of navigation to more insidious information operations and attacks on our cyber infrastructure. Contested access to airspace and sea lines of communication will present future challenges across all AORs, especially in INDOPACOM.

If confirmed, I will mitigate these challenges through:

- Resilient Basing: Distributed operating locations that integrate intra-base dispersal; advocating for targeted hardening, active defense measures, and robust base recovery capabilities to preserve combat power generation and rapidly resume operations in contested environments.
- Resilient Sustainment: Developing and advocating for an integrated, global sustainment network that leverages predictive capabilities, survivable distribution platforms, advanced cybersecurity, prepositioning, and operationalized War Reserve Materiel to enable mission generation in contested environments and the rapid transition from integrated deterrence to high-end conflict.
- Decision Advantage: Developing advanced decision support capabilities that translate logistics and sustainment data into echelon-specific, actionable information in near real-time.
- Deeper Interoperability with Allies & Partners: Integrated and assured logistics interoperability with Joint partners and Allies to include sharing of data, equipment, materiel, maintenance support, integrated base defense, and access to host nation services.

In your view, do these challenges require the services to generate more capabilities to deal with anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments, where we could face greater enemy mine or ISR capabilities?

Yes. The joint force must be capable of successfully conducting strategic logistics under persistent all-domain attack which will require the integration of JDDE operations with the full range of joint warfighting functions.

In addition to the mitigation strategy mentioned above, we need to ensure that mobility forces and combat forces are operating on connected communication networks to share information and enable mutual support in A2/AD environments. Today mobility forces are literally “flying blind”, unaware of potential threats because they have no sensors or defensive capabilities. Other critical capabilities, such as electromagnetic warfare, on and off-board force protection, and enhanced space and ISR capabilities will also be needed.

The future of warfare will naturally evolve and require new capabilities. No one capability is the solution, rather it is a combination of multiple capabilities, both technological and non-material, necessary to compete and win in the A2/AD environment.

Contested Logistics

Over the last several years, DOD and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) have conducted or sponsored several studies on contested mobility and logistics which have resulted in more than 50 recommendations. However, the GAO found that DOD has failed to implement many of these recommendations. As a result, DOD and INDOPACOM may be missing an opportunity to leverage existing knowledge on mobility challenges in

contested environments and increase resilience for major conflicts as envisioned in the NDS.

In your opinion, what are the highest priorities and key challenges that DOD must address in a contested logistics environment in a potential conflict with China and Russia? Please identify which of those challenges are unique to either China or Russia and which are common to both.

Key challenges common to both are the rapid emergence of persistent, all domain threats contesting the lines of communication from CONUS to final destination. Specific to the Indo-Pacific, the long distances and dearth of ground lines of communication add to the complexity.

This requires new concepts of maneuver that necessitate integration of logistics with all warfighting functions, an ability to deploy, maneuver and sustain forward forces with smaller, more dispersed footprints, and the agility to rapidly scale to deploy a decisive force.

Synchronizing the flow of logistics and forces into an area of operations requires rehearsal and training across multiple Combatant Commands. Exercises that allow the JDDE to tackle these complex tasks are also crucial to being ready for crisis and potential conflict.

In your view, what capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force present the most significant challenge to supporting TRANSCOM operations in these contested environments?

Projections of an increasingly complex and challenging operational environment demand anticipation of all-domain persistent attack, underscoring the importance of robust and resilient posture, credible global mobility capacity, and the ability to command and control and integrate global mobility operations. Ensuring sufficient and credible strategic airlift capacity (C-17 and C-5), continuous modernization of our air refueling aircraft (KC-135, KC-46, Next Generation Air Refueling System), and sustained recapitalization of our sealift fleet is critical to ensure USTRANSCOM can continue to project and sustain the Joint Force. Furthermore, analysis highlights a tight coupling between intra-theater air (C-130s) and sealift assets required to maneuver and sustain fielded forces given the lack of ground lines of communication in the Indo-Pacific region. Absent sufficient shallow-draft sealift vessels, requirements shift to intra-theater airlift, exacerbating already high airlift demands. DoD fuel distribution faces multiple challenges, driving an imperative for USTRANSCOM, as the DOD's single manager for Global Bulk Fuel Management and Delivery, to synchronize posture, planning, execution, and provide advocacy for capabilities and resources to meet the energy needs of the Joint Force in competition and conflict; with intra-theater fuel distribution and reliance on non-U.S. fuel shipping an elevated concern. Patient Movement operations for distributed forces operating over significant distances will also require a robust in-theater medical network. Casualty movement in a maritime environment with constrained resources, and an increasingly complex threat environment will jeopardize the "Golden Hour" standard of care we're accustomed to, with airlift needed for patient movement competing with other demands. The challenges of satisfying competing simultaneous demands, especially for airlift and air refueling, across significant distances and increasing velocity are compounded by the friction of an increasingly contested

environment. This places a premium on the credibility of our capacity: **ready, capable, and aware** mobility forces prepared to scale from campaigning to crisis to ensure global power projection requirements are met.

Which programs, in your assessment, are the highest priorities for mitigating current and emerging warfighting capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the Joint Force?

As an initial assessment, the highest priorities are modernized mobility programs at the required capacity – Bridge Tanker for Air Refueling, Next Generation Air Refueling System (NGAS), and Strategic Sealift recapitalization. These fleets must be connected, aware, and survivable to maintain our advantage against a capable and determined near-peer adversary, through investing in connecting mobility forces with combatant forces to improve situational awareness. The capability to effectively sense adversary threats and activities in our logistics networks would help mitigate risk inherent in deploying and sustaining the force in a contested environment. Global mobility posture can improve with prepositioned stocks, enhanced Access, Basing, and Overflight, and Allied and partner interoperability. Within the command, control, and integration portfolio, the ability to sense, control and scale the mobility enterprise – at echelon and at pace – is a critical priority as well.

Given the “tyranny of distance” in the Pacific, there are significant challenges specifically related to energy requirements in a contested environment, which could be mitigated by making targeted investments and operational energy improvements to both military platforms and installations.

If confirmed, what role would you take to reduce contested logistics vulnerabilities in INDOPACOM and elsewhere, and what specific operational energy improvements do you envision pursuing?

USTRANSCOM’s Unified Command Plan mission to synchronize the Joint Petroleum Enterprise and advocate for resources to address the vulnerabilities represents a new approach to managing a commodity for the Department. As USTRANSCOM stepped into its new role as the Single Manager for Global Bulk Fuel, it identified the key strategic gaps that need to be addressed. Now, new capabilities such as Bulk Fuel Feasibility Assessments (BFFA) and Fuel Integration and Synchronization Officers (FISOs) improve analytic rigor and visibility into global requirements to fill these strategic gaps with actionable investments. The two highest priority, near-term initiatives the Command should pursue are the ability to see the global inventory and distribution capabilities to make risk-informed prioritization decisions; and assured access to maritime tanker vessels in INDOPACOM to address the shortfall in distribution of fuel to the point of need.

If confirmed, two possible solutions I will explore involve working with allies and partners on agreements for access to shallow draft tankers as well as integrating their fuel storage and distribution capabilities with our own. It is critical that we tightly coordinate with U.S., allied, and partner commercial industry. The global petroleum market is one of the largest and most

robust networks in the world. We should leverage that resiliency with innovative government-industry partnerships to reduce risk.

Experience in Managing Logistics Operations

What steps do you believe you need to take to achieve a more complete understanding of the logistics operations of the other component commands of TRANSCOM?

If confirmed, my first step would be to get a capabilities and readiness assessment from my Component Commanders, so that I can better understand their operational problems and any constraints related to crisis or contingency operations. I want to hear from my headquarters staff to understand how we integrate and support our components and manage risk and daily global priorities, as well as our process to integrate Combatant Command contingency plans. I will also get a pulse from USTRANSCOM's global customer base to get an understanding of how well we are doing to support their priorities and plans. I intend to visit field units to understand their challenges and ensure they have the requisite resources and training to accomplish the mission.

In your view, should there be a single manager in charge of contested logistics for the Department of Defense to coordinate efforts between the services? Do you believe TRANSCOM should own that mission?

Contested logistics exceeds the purview of any one command. I do, however, believe that we should have greater coordination between the services and the Combatant Commands. The 2023 Unified Command Plan specified USTRANSCOM responsibilities and CDRUSTRANSCOM serves as the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator (JDDC). In this role, the JDDC exercises coordinating authority for operations and planning across all domains and collaborates with other Combatant Commands, Military Departments, and as directed, U.S. Government Agencies and commercial entities. USTRANSCOM has an inherent responsibility to coordinate JDDE activities in a contested logistics environment.

Civil Reserve Air Fleet

The military services rely heavily on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to supplement organic airlift in order to meet the TRANSCOM's wartime and peacetime transportation requirements.

What is your assessment of the CRAF's ability to meet requirements to transport any equipment, materials, or commodities for U.S. military operations or to respond to a humanitarian disaster?

The CRAF program is fully subscribed and provides 90% of air passenger and 40% of air cargo wartime movement. In FY23, CRAF carriers provided 3,432 missions with the capacity to move over 390,000 passengers and 168,000 short tons of air cargo. The CRAF International Long-Range segment provides DoD with substantial inter-theater airlift, effectively doubling DoD strategic airlift capacity. Delivery of cargo and passengers in a non-permissive environment

requires additional planning and considerations to assure the safety of our CRAF carriers. Overall, the CRAF program remains well-positioned to support humanitarian assistance and military operations. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our CRAF partners to ensure they remain committed and ready to support DoD requirements.

How much should we be relying on CRAF to meet our peacetime and wartime airlift requirements?

The current level of support the CRAF program provides to meet airlift requirements is appropriate under the National Airlift Policy and assessment of Joint Force demands. The National Airlift Policy underpins the importance and interdependence of military and civilian airlift to fulfill national objectives and is designed to leverage the commercial air carrier industry to provide capacity beyond that available in the organic military airlift fleet. In peacetime, our balance is consistent with the requirement to maintain the proficiency and operational readiness of the organic military requirement, while ensuring the capability of our commercial partners to meet their approved wartime requirements outlined in the Mobility Capability Requirements Study for NDAA FY20. In a contested environment, the Department must consider the safe employment of CRAF aircraft, including decisions about trans-load locations for onward movement through organic airlift.

What changes, if any, do you think need to be made to CRAF—authorities, requirements, composition—to ensure that CRAF can continue to meet our needs?

I do not believe there is a need for change at this time. USTRANSCOM, components, and government partners continuously assess the health and viability of the CRAF program to meet NDS requirements. The Mobility Capability Requirements Study informs CRAF program changes. USTRANSCOM continually monitors commercial modernization and required adherence to environmental regulations. While I anticipate changes in commercial fleet composition, I fully expect CRAF carriers will continue to meet requirements. If confirmed, I acknowledge the need to continually assess all facets of the CRAF program to ensure it meets our needs and supports the NDS.

Sealift

When the United States goes to war, TRANSCOM moves approximately 90% of its cargo requirements with the strategic sealift fleet, which consists of government-owned ships augmented by the commercial U.S.-flagged fleet.

What is your assessment of current and planned organic strategic sealift capacity?

Over the past two decades, Department of Defense mobility studies have consistently validated the requirement for approximately 20 million square feet of Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) sealift capacity. The Maritime Administration's Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and U.S. Government's Prepositioning Fleet provide approximately eighty percent of the capacity. The remainder is sourced commercially through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). Over the next 10 years, 29 of 47 RRF RO/RO vessels will retire. The readiness of this aging fleet is a top

readiness concern. A long-term, stable, and resourced strategy to increase fleet readiness, recapitalize the sealift fleet through purchasing used commercial ships for immediate readiness relief, and procurement of new ships will ensure we maintain sufficient capacity and industrial base to meet the needs of the NDS.

What do you believe is the appropriate mix of new construction, used ship purchasing, and service life extensions that the Department should employ in the Ready Reserve Force recapitalization plan?

I defer to the U.S. Navy within the context of their Service responsibilities to retain a viable surge sealift capacity to deliver the decisive force. Most importantly, a long-term, stable and resourced strategy to increase fleet readiness, recapitalize the sealift fleet through purchasing used commercial ships for immediate readiness relief, and procurement of new ships will ensure we maintain sufficient capacity and industrial base to meet the needs of the NDS.

What is your view of the importance of maintaining U.S.-flagged vessels to participate in strategic sealift, including through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement and Maritime Security Program?

It is critically important that we maintain a viable U.S.-flagged sealift capability to support Department needs. The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, a sealift Emergency Preparedness Program in place since 1997, provides assured access to commercial sealift and intermodal shipping services necessary to meet mobilization requirements with no direct peacetime cost to the DoD. The vessels within VISA provide approximately nineteen percent of the Department's surge deployment capacity, and the majority of its sustainment capacity. Sixty Maritime Security Program (MSP) vessels are legally obligated to enroll in VISA and can then receive an annual stipend intended to help offset the higher cost of operating a U.S. flagged, U.S crewed ship in international trade. Additionally, the renewed Voluntary Tanker Agreement and associated Tanker Security Program, an offset program as well, are designed to provide assured access to a fleet of U.S.-flag product tankers, reducing the Department's reliance on foreign flag tankers.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of the current and qualified, licensed merchant mariner population who would be available to crew strategic sealift vessels to meet surge and protracted TRANSCOM requirements?

U.S.-flagged commercial sealift industry employs a pool of trained and ready U.S. Merchant Mariners needed to crew the organic surge fleet when it transitions from reduced operating status to fully operational status. In accordance with Presidential Directives and National Policy, USTRANSCOM relies on the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD) to determine whether adequate manpower is available to activate and operate the ships of the Ready Reserve Force during a crisis. MARAD currently estimates there are sufficient mariners to activate the surge fleet but would be challenged to concurrently sustain both the organic and commercial fleets through a crew rotation. Any additional decrement to U.S. Merchant Mariner availability increases the risk to the surge fleet. I am encouraged by MARAD's approach to collaboratively identify issues, potential solutions, and support a whole-of-government approach to address this national security matter.

Global Household Goods Contract

For more than five years, TRANSCOM has attempted to consolidate its Global Household Goods Contract (GHC) into a single prime contractor that would oversee close to 1,000 subcontractors in charge of moving service members and their families.

What is your assessment of the new household goods program?

The Department of Defense has worked to improve the personal property program and address systemic issues such as a lack of quality service for decades. The GHC phase-in that USTRANSCOM and the military services began in April of 2024 and conducted during the 2024 peak summer moving season with a limited number of local shipments has gone well. The new information technology used in GHC which allows customers mobile device access on key aspects of their move including the location of their moving team and their shipment in-transit is a significant improvement for our service members' moving experience. I am encouraged by the initial service member feedback about the quality of service received through the GHC, including service from new providers not previously involved in the DoD program. If confirmed, ensuring a smooth transition for all CONUS moves, followed by OCONUS moves next Fall, will be a priority to ensure full operational capability of GHC for our servicemembers worldwide.

There have been reports of shortages of subcontractor movers not agreeing to contract terms with the prime contractor leading to the new contract being in jeopardy for inter-state moves.

What is your current understanding of how the prime contractor has secured necessary mover capacity for both intra and interstate moves to align with the ramping up of the contract?

HomeSafe Alliance disclosed to USTRANSCOM that numerous industry partners have signed on to their network, and HomeSafe demonstrated the capacity to support DoD's initial phase-in plan at all locations currently activated. HomeSafe forecasts it will be able to fully support the remaining parts of the DoD CONUS phase-in plan with both intra- and inter-state capacity in the coming months. HomeSafe's ability to optimize provider capacity across the nation and inter-state routes is a feature that does not exist in our current personal property program and is expected to result in additional capacity. To ensure a successful transition occurs, DoD's transition plan, as needed, will adjust the volume of shipments awarded to HomeSafe or military installations transitioning to GHC.

If confirmed, what will you do to provide transparency and information to families planning moves?

If confirmed, I will continue to foster and grow our relationship with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OSD P&R). In partnership with OSD P&R, USTRANSCOM migrated all GHC and personal property information to the Military OneSource website. This collaboration benefits our service members and families seeking relocation

information and exposes military families to the other vast resources and assistance available to them through the Military OneSource portal.

As GHC expands across the DoD, I will ensure USTRANSCOM's GHC public information page, where the USTRANSCOM Public Affairs office keeps the latest updates and press releases for service members and families, media, industry and other public stakeholders informed, remains current as key events occur.

Internal to the Department, USTRANSCOM developed a GHC Communication Toolkit, which was designed specifically for local personal property offices to use when engaging with unit leaders, service members, and military families at their respective installations. Insights from USTRANSCOM's change readiness survey data reflect that the local offices feel extremely confident and equipped to use tools in place to provide government oversight, and to communicate this major change to service members and families at their installations.

Cybersecurity

Most of the critical communications and operations of the Defense Department can be conducted over the classified internet service of the Department, which is not connected to the public internet and is therefore much more protected against eavesdropping, espionage, and disruption by computer network attacks. TRANSCOM, however, must communicate over the unclassified internet with many private-sector entities that are essential to the Defense Department's force generation and deployment operations in the transportation and shipping industries in particular.

What actions do you plan to take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Department reduces the risk of cyber intrusions that would affect TRANSCOM's operations?

As the USTRANSCOM Air Component Deputy Commander, I know USTRANSCOM made significant advances to reduce the risk of cyber intrusions. As a warfighting combatant command, USTRANSCOM conducts globally integrated mobility operations with both military and commercial entities, and as such, cybersecurity is of the utmost importance. If confirmed, I will assess progress, and continue to make cyber mission assurance a top priority for the Command, ensuring the appropriate investments are made to protect Command and Control / Information Technology systems and infrastructure that are most consequential to mission success. I expect my focus areas will include adopting security best practices, continuously improving the cybersecurity posture of the most critical systems and strengthening partnerships with the Department to continue progress on implementing an enhanced cybersecurity framework built upon Zero Trust principles, capabilities, technologies, solutions and processes across our architectures, systems, and within our budget and execution plans.

Do you believe that the current posture of TRANSCOM and the Department is sufficient to deal with adversaries in cyberspace?

The current posture of USTRANSCOM is sufficient to deal with adversaries in cyberspace although it is critical that the Command remains vigilant given how quickly our adversaries

continue to advance their own capabilities. USTRANSCOM will work with the Department and the broader U.S. Government to ensure our cybersecurity posture is ready. Specific activities include strengthening partnerships with the commercial Transportation Service Providers, the National Security Agency (NSA), Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in areas including information-sharing and collaboration initiatives, and to work with them to modernize capabilities that aim to generate decision advantage and facilitate mission assurance for USTRANSCOM's and the Department's global operations.

What do you believe are the critical needs of TRANSCOM for operating in the presence of cybersecurity threats?

USTRANSCOM should remain focused on cyber resiliency and digital modernization to ensure its ability to conduct globally integrated command and control, generate decision advantage, enhance response actions to threats posed by cyber adversaries, and reduce vulnerabilities across the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). In close coordination with its Transportation Service Providers, USTRANSCOM should continue to evolve contract language in alignment with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cybersecurity framework and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) cybersecurity requirements to mitigate cyber risk and increase information-sharing and collaboration amongst partners.

How important is it that TRANSCOM be aware of cyber intrusions by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors into the networks of airlines, shippers, and other defense contractors that enable the Command's operations?

Because commercial industry provides a significant portion of USTRANSCOM's capacity, it is vitally important that USTRANSCOM is aware of cyber intrusions by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors. Additionally, all USTRANSCOM contracts must include baseline protections for contractor information systems and establish reporting requirements for cybersecurity incidents.

How do you integrate these private sector airlines, shippers and other logistics entities into your cybersecurity planning and training exercises?

USTRANSCOM's integration is demonstrated through its biweekly published cybersecurity pulse newsletters to industry, collaboration opportunities for a whole-of-government approach during exercises—like the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's "Cyber Storm Nine" global cybersecurity exercise this past April—and technical exchanges. Since early 2023, USTRANSCOM coordinated cybersecurity technical exchanges with the Transportation Service Providers (TSPs). USTRANSCOM also leverages recurring engagements with the TSPs at Executive Working Groups and National Defense Transportation Association meetings that include cybersecurity briefs and cybersecurity focus group sessions. These exchanges are orchestrated by USTRANSCOM senior cybersecurity experts and are intended to discuss recommended cybersecurity practices and technology to facilitate capable, threat-informed cyber defenses within the transportation sector. Topics range from incident response, orchestration/automation, artificial intelligence, cloud migration, and digital modernization.

How do you work with or coordinate with relevant critical infrastructure sector providers on cybersecurity issues, including with the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)?

USTRANSCOM is strengthening partnerships across the Department and the interagency to increase information-sharing and collaboration initiatives. USTRANSCOM maintains strong relationships with USCYBERCOM, USNORTHCOM and the interagency as it relates to Defense Critical Infrastructure. USTRANSCOM engages with CISA both directly and via the liaison officers (LNOs) embedded throughout the Department. To be proactive, USTRANSCOM routinely shares information with industry on cyber threats and presents opportunities to participate in programs focused on increasing cybersecurity resiliency, to include the National Security Agency's (NSA) cybersecurity services. Such services aim to reduce risk by identifying vulnerabilities, protecting information, and partnering with NSA to receive non-public, Defense Industrial Base (DIB)-specific threat intelligence. USTRANSCOM also leverages a close relationship with the United States Coast Guard with their authorities granted through the POTUS-signed Executive Order signed 21 February 2024 that allows them to have express authority to respond to malicious cyber activity at the ports.

When TRANSCOM becomes aware of an APT intrusion into an operationally critical contractor, what steps should the Command take to determine whether operational plans should be adjusted to mitigate the risk of the intrusion affecting military operations?

When an intrusion is detected, USTRANSCOM executes a mission risk assessment process to determine if/when/how to execute specific actions to mitigate risks to a mission or operation. The risk assessment process gathers relevant information from across the Command and interagency to consider the appropriate operational and technical mitigation actions needed based on the threat, vulnerabilities, and potential mission impact. The mitigation steps are generally a broad-scope, collaborative effort across government, industry, and the international community in some situations. The Defense Transportation System has modal and nodal resiliency, facilitating flexibility and availability of alternative options to minimize risk. If confirmed, I will work to ensure USTRANSCOM continues to detect, assess and mitigate cyber intrusions.

Relationship with the Military Departments

TRANSCOM relies on the services to make strategic acquisition planning decisions, such as the KC-46 tanker for refueling and the Rough Terrain Container Handler for port loading.

How should the TRANSCOM be involved in this process, and do you believe the Command's needs are sufficiently taken into account?

Department processes provide multiple venues for USTRANSCOM to voice Joint Force requirements and identify challenges facing the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). As a Combatant Command, USTRANSCOM is responsible to define the mobility

capability and capacity requirements necessary to meet the National Defense Strategy. The Mobility Capability Requirements Study and Fuel Tanker Vessel Study are two examples that inform the Department and Congress on how well postured the JDDE is with respect to meeting global demands. The Services are responsible to provide a trained and ready capability consistent with the NDS. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely with the DoD and Services to ensure there is a common understanding of capability and capacity requirements and potential risk associated with investments or lack thereof.

Should the service force providers change their equipment or units to field better capability to conduct logistics operations in contested environments? If so, how?

I believe the Services are on the path to modifying their equipment and force constructs in recognition of the challenges of the changing contested battlespace. USTRANSCOM has worked diligently with the Joint Staff and the Services to highlight the impact of rising operational demands on a historically underfunded logistics enterprise. For example, it has been an active partner with the Joint Staff and the Services in developing and executing the Joint Warfighting Concept and associated Supporting Concepts, specifically the Joint Concept for Contested Logistics. This family of concepts guides investment and divestment decisions for the Department to design and develop a more lethal future Joint Force, capable of conducting assured logistics operations across persistently contested environments. Additionally, Service-level concepts like the Air Force's Agile Combat Employment, the Army's Multi-Domain Operations, and the Navy/Marine Corps' Distributed Maritime Operations are providing the impetus for relooking at how we would organize and fight against capable peer adversaries. These concepts all envision a future Joint Force able to employ more lean and agile units quickly in a distributed construct, reducing target profiles and providing dilemmas to adversary targeting.

Adversaries continue to study and plan against our comparative advantage in logistics and mobility operations. Global war-games and simulations continue to highlight adversary abilities to degrade our power projection capabilities under persistent, all-domain attack. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate, as the coordinator of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise, with the Services, other Combatant Commands and the Department to address capability gaps and prioritize investments to enable future logistics and transportation functions, supporting Joint Force operations in contested environments.

TRANSCOM is the only combatant command that sets aircraft requirements by total aircraft instead of via primary mission aircraft inventory (PMAI).

Do you believe that the Combatant Commanders should determine total fleet sizes for the services or should they advocate for specific requirements for their assigned and apportioned forces? Why or why not?

Combatant Commanders determine their requirements in terms of capability and capacity to accomplish their Unified Command Plan (UCP) missions, as refined and prioritized in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). USTRANSCOM's charter is to provide the DoD the ability to project and sustain forces across the spectrum from campaigning, crisis, to conflict, with commensurate implications for mobility fleet capacity requirements in times of peace as well as

war. The Services, within their responsibility to organize, train, and equip forces must balance Combatant Command requirements with the funding available to provide forces within the funding constraints.

In the context of mobility programs, USTRANSCOM looks at the whole enterprise – airlift, sealift, air refueling and intra-theater lift, to include commercial capabilities, and advocates holistically for capacity in each area, which I believe remains prudent and appropriate. In addition, USTRANSCOM is the Mobility Joint Force Provider, having been assigned the predominance of mobility forces, and is responsible for current and future readiness. This perspective drives healthy discourse on risk perspectives and resource priorities across the Department. Overall, if confirmed I look forward to working with all the Services and I am satisfied with how I have seen them typically respond to joint needs once any underlying issues are addressed.

Peacetime-Wartime Logistics Management

Our transportation and logistics systems have been significantly altered over time to reduce organic military air and sealift capacity and to rely instead on commercial aircraft and sealift as well as commercial supply chains to deliver spare parts to deployed forces. This was done to reduce costs and increase buying power and flexibility for the military.

Is there increased risk from this approach? If so, what is the nature of that increased risk?

Yes, there is inherent risk to relying on our commercial partners to meet wartime requirements; however, I believe that they have stepped up to the challenge and are a strength of the greater Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise. For example, our industry partners help mitigate geographic access challenges by leveraging existing intermodal networks to transport military goods. The partnership we have formed through the years is exemplified in the work we do with the National Defense Transportation Association and Executive Working Groups. If confirmed, I will continue to meet with the heads of Transportation and Logistics corporations, and we will work to identify and address possible gaps.

The risk is presuming “just in time logistics” in a crisis—commercial industry prefers not to carry excess capacity and may lack both redundancy and resiliency. That risk is mitigated by complementary organic airlift and sealift fleets, sized through USTRANSCOM’s Mobility Capacity and Requirement Studies.

How should TRANSCOM plan for dealing with the risk inherent in such operations, for example, in providing equipment and logistics to deployed forces thousands of miles away in potential combat zones?

In planning and operations, USTRANSCOM closely works with commercial partners while monitoring the dynamic threat environment to mitigate risk and ensure the safe execution of mobility missions.

Specifically, USTRANSCOM mitigates risk for our commercial partners through Mission Assurance Working Groups that review threat levels, monitor infrastructure constraints, and ensure the safe operation of our commercial airlift and sealift partners. Supplementing these working groups, USTRANSCOM's components oversee the command and control of our chartered assets with a focus on protection. If necessary, a Mission Assurance Working Group may restrict commercial operations due to risk concerns. In these scenarios, USTRANSCOM will plan to transload from commercial to organic assets – relying on our commercial partners for low-risk inter-theater movements while our military mobility forces deliver to the point of need. Transloading at a large theater airport or seaport can also maximize the efficient use of strategic military airlift such as the C-17.

In your view, how would the nature of the relationship between TRANSCOM and commercial partners change in a wartime environment?

USTRANSCOM partners are an integral part of providing global assets and capability to support military operations anywhere in the world. The relationships with commercial partners are nurtured by regular engagements in peacetime to ensure lasting support in wartime. As history has shown, the relationship with commercial partners strengthens in wartime. In support of Operations Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom, and Allies Refuge, airlift partners in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program answered the call to activate and provide additional capacity to meet defense requirements. Similarly, commercial sealift provided the majority of the capability and capacity in support of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) movements to allies and partners in the EUCOM AOR (Ukraine). If confirmed, I will continue to work with our commercial partners to ensure the business relationships remain solid and continue to support DoD requirements.

If confirmed, how do you plan to find the appropriate balance for logistics capacity between commercial and military logistics systems?

Our ability to project military power is inextricably linked to commercial industry. The FY20 NDAA Mobility Capability and Requirements Study includes an assessment of the reliance on commercial transportation capacity in support of joint deployment requirements and considers the readiness of the organic fleet and speed of access to commercial capacity at time of need to inform a risk-informed balance between the two. Future operations in contested environments will require vigilance to ensure we minimize the threats our commercial providers face when transporting military cargo and personnel in non-permissive (wartime) environments. If confirmed, I will work with commercial industry, Department of Transportation, and other stakeholders to ensure commercial capacity is sufficient and appropriate to meet future demands.

The military relies on an extensive network of logistics facilities overseas to support our deployed forces. These overseas depots enable our deployed forces to remain on station longer without having to be supported directly from CONUS. These depots are in host nations, which are U.S. allies.

What is your assessment of the resiliency of these overseas depots, particularly in places near ongoing political instability?

As the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator, USTRANSCOM collaborates closely with regional combatant commands, Military Services, Defense Logistics Agency, and other strategic partners to develop and maintain an agile, secure, and resilient distribution network to support and sustain overseas forces and capabilities. This includes a network of strategically placed organic forces and purpose-built, resilient infrastructure to ensure our logistics support to combatant commands and allies is accomplished with precision and velocity. The resiliency of these locations relies on host nation support through agreements for logistic services such as stevedore contracts at the seaports and fuel supply agreements at airfields.

Regarding access in or near regions with political instability, we work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and other Combatant Commands to ensure access, basing, and overflight (ABO). We also constantly monitor the operational environment and respond to challenges, as appropriate, with the use of alternate distribution routes and logistics nodes to ensure the continued viability of those facilities. Our extensive networks of Allies and Partners is one of our great strengths, and these networks give us flexibility to react to any stability that might affect our ABO.

Emerging Technology

TRANSCOM's uniquely complex and data-heavy mission could present an opportunity to take greater advantage of emerging technology like data analytics or machine learning.

How do you believe TRANSCOM can most effectively leverage emerging technology for improved performance?

USTRANSCOM can most effectively leverage emerging technology through resourcing a robust RDT&E program, deepening our existing partnerships with the Defense Innovation Unit, increasing use of enterprise data and analytic platforms, and integrating emerging technology into our operational processes. USTRANSCOM's ability to leverage emerging technology must be enabled by a portfolio of information technology systems/platforms that reside on secured networks and takes advantage of continuous digital modernization. This will require the Command to continue to modernize IT systems by not only taking advantage of cloud computing services, but also through advancing the ability to manage data as a strategic asset. Accelerating the adoption of DOD's enterprise-wide multi-domain data, analytics, and artificial intelligence technologies will also present USTRANSCOM with an unprecedented opportunity to equip leaders at all levels with the data to make better decisions faster.

Integration of artificial intelligence also offers tremendous value in support of cyber operations within the DevSecOps environment for anomaly detection, predictive analytics, compliance monitoring, real-time monitoring, phishing detections, and vulnerability management. AI would enhance software development code reviews, optimization, generation, testing, and documentation.

Specifically related to artificial intelligence, are there applications or use cases within TRANSCOM that you see as most promising to demonstration or prototype to improve your operations?

Employing AI/Machine Learning to analyze data within USTRANSCOM logistics applications can identify trends, patterns, and improvements for logistics processes, streamline resource movement, and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. AI could also automate many portions of the Risk Management Framework, reducing administrative overhead.

The most compelling application of AI in USTRANSCOM operations is understanding, predicting, and prioritizing competing demands related to available capacity, which requires integration with components and commercial industries. AI will improve risk analysis, predictive and prescriptive analytics, and optimization capabilities, aiding decision-making at every level. AI must also be robust and reliable enough to function at the required speed and scale during contingency or wartime operations.

TRANSCOM is supporting efforts by the Air Force to develop a space cargo capability.

What are your views on this effort? How cost effective will it be and where would it be used?

USTRANSCOM leverages Cooperative Research and Development Agreements with commercial partners while collaborating in a wider US Government community of interest that includes the Department of the Air Force's Rocket Cargo program. USTRANSCOM is uniquely situated within the DoD to provide mobility expertise and act as connective tissue between this community and the Joint Force to realize a Point-to-Point Delivery capability.

Cost effectiveness is driven by the ability to provide the desired effect under circumstances wherein other modes of transportation are not able to deliver comparable effects. Based on the current pace of commercial space capability development, we expect the cost of Point-to-Point Delivery to fall by an order of magnitude in the 10 years following initial operating capability.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

Despite significant efforts by the Department and military services over the past decade to enhance their prevention of, and response to, sexual assaults, including measures to care for victims and hold assailants accountable, the current data continues to show increasing prevalence of sexual assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female service members aged 17 to 24. These findings echo reports this year of increases in the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at the Military Service Academies.

Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that the Department of Defense has put in place to prevent and respond to sexual assault, and to protect service members who report sexual assault from retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?

Yes, I do. I believe this because the Department of Defense (DoD) is taking unprecedented action to implement historic reforms to prevent and respond to sexual assault in the military. As of April 8, 2024, significant implementation actions have been undertaken or completed for 32 recommendations by the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military (IRC-SAM), approved by the Secretary of Defense. These recommendations include focusing on foundational prevention, improving climate and culture, reforming the military justice process, and enhancing victim assistance. Additionally, as of December 28, 2023, the Office of Special Trial Counsel (OSTC) reached full operational capability, shifting prosecutorial discretion for 13 serious criminal offenses, including sexual assault, away from commanders to specially trained and independent judge advocates who report directly to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Further, in May 2024, the DoD released the Fiscal Year 2023 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military. The report shows that the estimated prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment declined in the active force, compared to levels last measured in 2021. The next report with data on the prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment at the Military Service Academies will be released in 2025. Regarding retaliation, having these types of actions as an enumerated crime under the UCMJ should serve as a strong deterrent against this behavior.

The DoD also continues to prioritize the hiring of the Integrated Primary Prevention Workforce (IPPW) professionals. This full-time credentialed workforce takes a holistic approach to reducing risk factors and promoting protective factors to prevent harmful behaviors, such as sexual assault and sexual harassment. The IPPW work directly with leaders to change policies when appropriate, implement prevention activities, and promote the health of the military community. Over 1,000 IPPW are in place with the goal to hire 2,500 through FY2028.

If confirmed, what specific role would you establish for yourself in preventing sexual harassment within TRANSCOM, including within its civilian and contractor workforces?

If confirmed, my role will be to protect the safety and rights of all USTRANSCOM personnel, whether military, government civilian employees, or contractor workforce. I will continue the work of my predecessors to ensure all current requirements, policies and tracking methods for preventing sexual harassment are followed by the Command. In my current and past assignments, I met with the military experts and those charged with special responsibilities in these areas, including the Inspector General, Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim Advocates, Judge Advocates, and others. It will also be important to consult and work with OSD leaders to identify and implement all changes determined to be needed to ensure we have the tools and resources required to prevent sexual harassment.

Do you believe that you need additional authorities from Congress to improve upon existing programs to prevent sexual harassment and sexual assault?

I currently do not have sufficient information to answer this question, especially as it relates to USTRANSCOM and its component commands. The most recent DoD reforms are less than a year old and DoD is watching carefully to ensure they are followed and to track their effectiveness. If confirmed, I will work with each of the Component Commanders to gain feedback on sexual assault and harassment trends, program performance, and effectiveness.

Relations with Congress

What are your views on the state of TRANSCOM's relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

I believe USTRANSCOM has a good working relationship with the Committee and Congress in general. I am confident the Command is responsive to Congress' requests and aggressively works to meet any suspense set by Congress, whether it be for requests for information, briefings, office calls, or hearings.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and TRANSCOM?

If confirmed, I will continue the current working relationships already maintained by USTRANSCOM. I will make myself available to Congress, provide my best advice when asked, and ensure we continue to strive to meet all deadlines established by Congress.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic communications) and other information from the Department.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic communications), and other information as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.

Yes

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,

reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.

Yes

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.

Yes

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.

Yes

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer yes or no.

Yes

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes